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INTRODUCTION

The war in Vietnam is illegal and immoral. The question is, What
can we do to stop that war? What can we do to stop the people who, in
the name of America, are killing babies, women, and children? We
have to say to ourselves that there's a higher law than the law of a fool
named [Dean] Rusk; there's a higher law than the law of a buffoon
named [Lyndon] Johnson. It's the law of each of us. We will not
murder anybody who they say kill, and if we decide to kill, we 're going
to decide who it shall be. This country will only stop the war in

*
A. Gus Cleveland Distinguished Chair of Legal Ethics and Professionalism, University of
Georgia School of Law. B.A., Emory University, 1986; J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1989. First
and foremost, I thank my wife Kim for her perceptive observations, much needed encouragement,
and loving inspiration throughout the evolution of this Article. I am also grateful to Professor Kay
Levine, as well as my colleagues, Professors Russell Gabriel, Erica Hashimoto, and Lori Ringhand,
for their insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Kerrie Howze (Class of 2008)
provided abundant and invaluable research assistance during the early stages of the Article's
development, for which I am deeply appreciative. Finally, I would like to thank my 2009-2010
research assistants, Austin McClanahan and Will Owens, for their excellent work in support of this
project.
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Vietnam when the young men who are made to fight it begin to say,
"Hell, no, we ain't going." 1
This quote is from a speech delivered in 1966 at the University of California,
Berkeley by Black Power activist, and Chairman of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, Stokely Carmichael. 2 The Vietnam War was raging
and Carmichael's personal sentiments could not have been clearer-the war was
wrong, as were the American leaders who advocated its continuance. 3 Most
significantly, however, Carmichael openly called for draft-eligible young men
(black men in particular) to refuse induction, in direct contravention of the
Military Selective Service Act (SSA).5 Indeed, he expressed the view that such
adherence to a "higher law" was the only way to stop the war.6
This was neither the first nor the last time that Stokely Carmichael would
actively promote defiance of the draft as a means of combating what he (and
many others) considered to have been an unjust war in Vietnam.
Notwithstanding this, he was never indicted on federal charges for his antiwar
activities.
One might readily surmise that this made perfect sense, as
Carmichael was simply exercising his First Amendment right to free speech.9
The problem, though, is that not all speech-related activities are protected, and
one could argue that a great deal of Carmichael's antiwar rhetoric fell within this
unprotected zone. 10 Moreover, the government prosecuted others for words and

1.
Stokely Carmichael, Berkeley Speech (Oct. 1966), in STOKELY SPEAKS: BLACK POWER
BACK TO PAN-AFRICANISM 45, 52-53 (Ethel N. Minor ed., 1971) [hereinafter Carmichael,

Berkeley Speech].
2.

Id. at 45; JOHN LEWIS WITH MICHAEL D'ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR

OF THE MOvEMENT 368 (1998). In 1978, Carmichael changed his name to Kwame Ture in honor of
two African socialist leaders. Michael T. Kaufman, Stokely Carmichael, Rights Leader Who
Coined 'Black Power,'Dies at 57, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at B10. Throughout this Article,
however, I will refer to him by his more familiar former name.
3. See Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 52-53.
4. See id.
5. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1990); infra text accompanying notes 142-43. The Act was
also referred to as the Universal Military Training and Service Act. See Joseph O'Meara, "No Man
is Above the Law," 53 A.B.A. J. 1107, 1108 (1967).
6. Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 53.
7. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
9.

See, e.g., ROGER WILKINS, A MAN'S LIFE: AN AuTOBIOGRAPHY 231 (1982) (suggesting

that Ramsey Clark's refusal to prosecute Carmichael was likely appropriate because he "was
constitutionally incapable of prosecuting somebody just for speech"); Letter from Fred M. Vinson,
Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., to James 0. Eastland, U.S. Senator (Nov. 2, 1966) [hereinafter Eastland
Letter] (on file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box
61, "Anti-Riot Plans 1968") ("Thus far, Carmichael's statements appear to have been expressions of
opinions directed to general groups, and therefore protected by the First Amendment.").
10. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (observing that "[t]he most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic" and holding that the question to answer in determining the extent of First
Amendment protection is "whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
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actions that seemed less overt and provocative than his, most notably the Boston
Five, which included well-known pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock and
respected clergyman the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr.," who were
charged with conspiracy to aid and abet draft evasion, among other things. 12
On top of all this, President Lyndon B. Johnson and other prominent
political leaders strongly advocated for the prosecution of Stokely Carmichael.13
The target of these coercive efforts and the individual who princigally held
Carmichael's fate in his hands was Attorney General Ramsey Clark. As the
chief prosecutor for the United States, the decision of whether or not to prosecute
was ultimately his, and he steadfastly refused to pursue an indictment-much to
the dismay of President Johnson.15
Was Clark's refusal a courageous stand that exemplified the ideal of a truly
independent public prosecutor? Was it weak capitulation to avoid being labeled
as unsympathetic to the plight of blacks in America during a racially charged
period in our history? 16 Or was it something else altogether, possibly some
deeply personal, unarticulated motivation? And, perhaps most importantly, did
the decision not to charge Stokely Carmichael, whatever its basis, constitute a
proper exercise of Clark's discretion as a prosecutor?
It is well established that prosecutors have enormously broad discretion in
making charging decisions, both in terms of the nature of the potential crime to
be charged and whether a given charge should even be pursued.17 The only

nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent"); O'Meara, supra note 5, at 1108-10 (arguing that Carmichael's
rhetoric was akin to the classic example of someone falsely yelling fire in a movie theater, which is
plainly not constitutionally protected). But see WILKINS, supra note 9, at 231; Maurice Kelman, On
ProsecutingSedition: A Reply to Dean O'Meara,54 A.B.A. J. 164, 165-66 (1968) (arguing that the

First Amendment protected Carmichael's antiwar activities and thus did not run afoul of the
Selective Service laws).
11. See generally JESSICA MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK, THE REV. WILLIAM SLOANE
COFFIN, JR., MICHAEL FERBER, MITCHELL GOODMAN, AND MARCUS RASKIN (1969) (providing a

thorough treatment of the trial).
12. See Indictment, U.S. v. Coffin, No. 68-1-F Crim. (D. Mass. Jan. 5, 1968), reprinted in
MITFORD, supranote 11, app. 1,at 251-55 (1969) [hereinafter Boston Five Indictment].
13. See infra notes 96-98, 116-22 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 127-39 and accompany text.
15. See WILKINS, supra note 9, at 230 (observing that "Johnson despised us at Justice,
because we wouldn't put Stokely Carmichael in jail"); infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
16. Interview by T.H. Baker with Harry McPherson, former special counsel to President
Johnson, in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 9, 1969) [hereinafter McPherson Interview], available at http://
www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/mcpherson/mcpher05.pdf
("[McPherson] felt that Ramsey [Clark] had so intense a concern that he not be regarded as an anticivil libertarian that he was letting go of one of the main reins of power that the public expects an
Attorney General to exercise, which was the prosecuting function.").
17.

See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL

§ 9-27.110

cmt. (1997) ("[T]he

prosecutor has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute for
apparent violations of Federal criminal law."); R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 14

(2005) ("[T]he decisions of whether to charge, whom to charge, and what crimes to charge are an
awesome source of power for the government lawyer."); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL
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tangible limitations on this power are the requirements that the alleged crime be
supported by probable cause" and that the decision to prosecute not be
motivated by unconstitutional considerations, 19 neither of which is generally
regarded as a very significant check.20

MISCONDUCT § 1.14 (3d ed. 2003) ("[T]he prosecutor exercises extremely broad discretion in the
decision to indict or initiate criminal proceedings against a suspected wrongdoer and, to a large
extent, that decision is unassailable."); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the
Prosecutor'sExercise of the ChargingDiscretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 513 (1993) ("[T]he

prosecutor's decision to institute criminal charges is the broadest and least regulated power in
American criminal law."); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States, 18

AM. J. CoMP. L. 532, 532 (1970) ("One of the most striking features of the American system of
criminal justice is the broad range of largely uncontrolled discretion exercised by the prosecutor.");
infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
18. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion." (alteration in original) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)

(2009) (providing that a "prosecutor in the criminal case shall: ... refrain from prosecuting a charge
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause").
The guidelines for U.S. Attorneys, which do not have the force of law, contain a somewhat
more exacting standard or aspirational measure with regard to charging decisions. The comment to
section 9-27.220 of the U.S. Attorney's Manual provides that "both as a matter of fundamental
fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be
initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will be found
guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, § 9-27.220 cmt. (1997).
In a similar vein, the non-binding American Bar Association Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice maintain that:
A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not
supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction.
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9(a) (1992).

19. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 ("[T]he decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification' . . . ."
(quoting Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 364)); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 17,

§ 9-27.260

(1997)

(providing that prosecutors should not consider "race, religion, sex, national origin, or political
association, activities or beliefs" in making charging decisions). A related limitation on prosecutors
in making charging decisions is that they must not prosecute a defendant in order to penalize the
defendant for exercising a constitutional or statutory right. Prosecuting for this reason would
constitute "vindictive prosecution" a violation of the defendant's due process rights. See, e.g.,
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 ("To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to
pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is
'patently unconstitutional."' (citation omitted) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33
n.20 (1973))).
20. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 15 (expressing the view that "[p]robable cause is a very
low evidentiary threshold" and "has been criticized as inadequate to meet the prosecutor's
overriding obligations as a minister of justice"); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT § 4:9 (2d ed. 2002) (observing that findings of discriminatory enforcement on the part
of prosecutors are rare); Gershman, supra note 17, at 513 n.2 ("The doctrines of selective,
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Indeed, there is a legitimate perception that prosecutors are prone to exploit
the ephemeral "probable cause" constraint, at times charging or overcharging
defendants founded on evidence admittedly too insubstantial to establish guilt.2
And claims of selective prosecution based on race or some other protected status
are nearly impossible to prove.22 Outrage, accompanied by claims of abuse of
discretion and prosecutorial misconduct, are not uncharacteristic responses to
questionable charging decisions, 23 but almost always without consequence. 24

vindictive, and bad faith prosecutions provide modest constraints on the prosecutor's charging
power."); Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged The ProsecutorialChargingDecision and the
Innocence Revolution, CARDozo L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545937 (observing that the "probable cause" standard is "inherently quite
minimal; it only requires enough evidence for the individual prosecutor subjectively to think it is
more likely than not that the person committed the crime").
21.

See ANGELA

J. DAVIS,

ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER

OF THE AMERICAN

PROSECUTOR 31 (2007) (maintaining that "[p]rosecutors routinely engage in overcharging");
Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession'sFailure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors,36 HOFSTRA

L. REV. 275, 284-85 (2007) ("The low charging standard of probable cause encourages abuse of the
charging power, allowing prosecutors to charge an individual in order to intimidate, harass, or
coerce a guilty plea in a case in which the government cannot meet its burden of proof at trial.");
Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (maintaining that

the probable cause standard is so minimal that "it would allow a prosecutor to charge two
individuals in two separate cases with the same criminal conduct even when the prosecutor knows
that only one of the two could possibly have engaged in the alleged conduct").
22. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
23. One fairly recent example is the racially divisive prosecution in 2007 of six black high
school students in Jena, Louisiana for their attack on a white classmate. See generallyAnthony V.
Alfieri, Prosecutingthe Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1288-91 (2008) (describing the legal
and political climate surrounding the prosecution of the defendants). In this case, the prosecutor
charged the so-called "Jena Six" with, among other crimes, attempted second degree murder for an
assault that resulted in serious, but far from life-threatening, injuries to the victim. Clarence Page,
Op-Ed., Injustice is Bigger than 'Jena 6,' GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Michigan), Sept. 25, 2007, at A8;

see also Alfieri, supra at 1290 (indicating that the district attorney amended the original indictment
by adding attempted second-degree murder).
Following an avalanche of criticism, including demonstrations reminiscent of bygone days of
the civil rights movement, the prosecutor reduced the charges to lesser crimes. Boiling Point:
Thousands March in Tiny Jena, La., to Protest the Arrest of 6 Black Teens, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21,

2007, at 8 ("[The district attorney] initially charged five of the black youths with attempted
murder-charges he reduced to aggravated second-degree battery after black bloggers and civil
rights leaders from across the country raised complaints that the charges were excessive."); see also
Alfieri, supra at 1290-91 (recounting the various protests associated with the prosecution of the
Jena Six); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors' Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461,
469 (2009) ("[T]he disparity between no criminal punishment for the white students and heavy
charges for the black students led to community and national protests."); Miguel Bustillo, Nooses
Stir a Year of Racial Unrest, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2007, at A9 ("The case ...

elicited outrage

around the world-not only because of the stiff charges brought against the black teenagers, but
because of the stark contrast between the way black boys and white boys in the same town were
treated.").
Notwithstanding the lowering of the charges, the prosecutor still wrongfully insisted upon
trying the first defendant-seventeen-year-old Mychal Bell-as an adult on charges of aggravated
second degree battery and conspiracy to commit second degree battery. See Podgor,supra at 468
(observing that it was improper to try Bell as an adult on these charges as he was facing them for the

HeinOnline -- 62 S. C. L. Rev. 5 2010-2011

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

6

[VOL. 62: 1

Refusals to initiate criminal proceedings, on the other hand, despite what
may seem to be compelling evidence of guilt, do not typically elicit as strong of
a public reaction25 nor are such decisions normally called into question. 26In
fact, they are essentially impervious to any sort of meaningful scrutiny,27 left
wholly to a prosecutor's subjective assessment of the facts and evidence
involved.28
Notwithstanding the Teflon nature of a prosecutor's charging decision,
Attorney General Ramsey Clark's refusal to prosecute Stokely Carmichael and
his contemporaneous prosecution of the all-white Boston Five raise a legitimate
question with regard to his exercise of discretion. This Article examines the
fascinating people, evidence, and sociopolitical influences that Clark faced while

first time); Miguel Bustillo, 'Jena Six' Teenager is Freedon Bail, L.A. TEVIES, Sept. 28, 2007, at

Al0 (noting that a Louisiana appeals court vacated the verdict convicting Bell of aggravated battery
and conspiracy to commit aggravated battery on the ground that he was unlawfully tried as an
adult). While certainly criticized for his charging decisions, the prosecutor was apparently never
subjected to any sort of professional censure.
24. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 23-24 (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08) (discussing the
judicial deference accorded to prosecutors' charging decisions); GERSHMAN, supra note 20, § 4:3
(noting the "extraordinary deference" historically afforded to prosecutors with regard to charging
and the rarity of a judical challenge); Podgor, supra note 23, at 464 ("Although courts may mention
improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor when dismissing charges, the prosecutorial conduct
is seldom the exclusive basis for the dismissal of the charges.").
25. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 17, at 535 (observing the tendency to view prosecutors'
exercise of discretion in this regard as not being a concern "on the ground that only acts of leniency
are involved").
26.

See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A

CRIME 154 (1969) (noting that "[m]any persons who are in fact guilty of a crime and who could be
convicted are ... not charged at all" and that legislatures and courts rarely call these prosecutorial
decisions into question).
27. See Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (1965) (per curiam) (holding that the U.S.
Attorney General's exercise of prosecutorial discretion may not be controlled through mandamus);
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86

IOWA L. REV. 393, 410 (2001) ("[T]he decision to forego charges is entirely within the discretion of
the prosecutor."); LaFave, supra note 17, at 538 ("Although the American criminal justice system
has reasonably effective controls to ensure that the prosecutor does not abuse his power by
prosecuting upon less than sufficient evidence, there are-as a practical matter-no comparable
checks upon his discretionary judgment of whether or not to prosecute one against whom sufficient
evidence exists."); infra note 222 and accompanying text.
28.

See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 3-

3.9(b) ("The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The
prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline
to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a
conviction."); Medwed, supra note 20, at 11 (noting that the prosecutorial charging standard in
"almost every jurisdiction is entirely subjective"); Ronald Dworkin, On Not Prosecuting Civil
Disobedience, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 6, 1968, at 14 ("A prosecutor may properly decide not to
press charges if the lawbreaker is young, or inexperienced, or the sole support of a family, or is
repentant, or turns state's evidence, or if the law is unpopular or unworkable or generally disobeyed,
or if the courts are clogged with more important cases, or for dozens of other reasons."); infra note
223 and accompanying text.
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navigating through a daunting prosecutorial minefield, and critically analyzes the
legal propriety of the course he ultimately chose.
The Article first provides significant personal details about both Ramsey
Clark and Stokely Carmichael, with an emphasis on Clark's impressive civil
rights pedigree 29 and Carmichael's putatively unlawful anti-Vietnam War
activities. 30
It then proceeds to explore Clark's refusal to prosecute
Carmichael,1 a decision that reportedly involved an exhaustive investigation
into the underlying facts that might have supported federal charges.32 While he
maintained that the evidence was lacking and held that up as his explanation for
not pursuing Carmichael, 33 this portion of the Article calls into question Clark's
tidy rationale, given its narrow focus on the ambiguous crime of "conspiracy to
incite a riot."34 In particular, there seems to have been ample support for
proceeding against Carmichael on separate and more easily provable charges
related to "aiding and abetting draft evasion," the principal foundation for
Clark's prosecution of the Boston Five.35
The Article concludes with a probing examination of the propriety of
Ramsey Clark's non-prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion undoubtedly influenced by the substance of
Carmichael's racially-themed antiwar message. 36 More precisely, Carmichael's
rhetoric surely resonated with Clark in light of his well-documented commitment
to securing equal rights for black Americans.37 Was this, however, a valid
ground on which to forego prosecution, especially considering its direct link to
race?
In the end, when assessed against the backdrop of Clark's temporally related
and factually weaker prosecution of the all-white Boston Five, his decision may
aptly be described as an act of "prosecutorial indiscretion."
This

29. See discussion infra Part II.A.
30. See discussion infra Part II.B.
31. See discussion infra Part Ill.
32. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
34. See discussion infra Part III.B.
35. It is important to note that the charges against the Boston Five were limited solely to
counts for conspiracyto aid and abet violations of the draft laws. See infra text accompanying note
158. This narrow focus is difficult to explain in light of the fact that Ramsey Clark could have
made a much stronger case against these defendants for individual acts of aiding and abetting. See
infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. Clark, however, has suggested that one reason for this
type of charge was to narrow the field of prospective defendants to avoid having to prosecute large
numbers of low level individuals who were less culpable than the alleged "conspirators."
Telephone Interview with Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y Gen. 4-5 (July 26, 2010). For a
discussion of some other possible explanations for the government's approach to this case, see
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, AMERICA ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT TRANSFORMED
OUR NATION 383-87 (2004). See also MITFORD, supra note 11, at 63-72 (recounting the possible
strategic and procedural benefits to the prosecution associated with a "conspiracy" charge as
opposed to a straightforward "aiding and abetting" charge).
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
37. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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characterization, in my view, strikes the appropriate balance between
denunciation and praise-it recognizes the facial impropriety of Clark's
disparate handling of the two matters but stops well short of outright
condemnation. Such a measured appraisal justly acknowledges the ominous and
unprecedented complexity of the circumstances, as well as Ramsey Clark's
admirable desire to calibrate the troubled and unequal existence of black
Americans in the 1960s by, in effect, according them preferential treatment
under federal law.
II. THE PROTAGONISTS

A. Ramsey Clark and His Civil Rights Pedigree
In 1961, Ramsey Clark left the private practice of law to join President John
F. Kennedy's Administration as the Assistant Attorney General for the Lands
Division of the Department of Justice, serving under Attorney General Robert
Kennedy.38 Though Clark's work on behalf of the Lands Division was certainly
valuable, his tenure in that role is more noteworthy for the courageous leadership
that he provided in securing and protecting the emerging civil rights of black
citizens. In particular, Attorney General Robert Kennedy enlisted Clark to
facilitate school integration in the South,39 which was progressing quite slowly
notwithstanding the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education40 eight
years earlier.
Throughout 1962 and 1963, Clark worked in Alabama, Geor ia, and South
Carolina to enforce the federal mandate of school desegregation. Even more
significantly, however, Clark was responsible for monitoring James Meredith's
historic, combative admission to the University of Mississippi from September
of 1962 to the spring of 1963.42 Profoundly affected by his Mississippi

38.

See C. DAVID HEYMANN, RFK: A CANDID BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY 192

(1998); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 29 (1971). For a more detailed account of the life
of Ramsey Clark, see Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Representing Saddam Hussein: The Importance of

Being Ramsey Clark,42 GA. L. REV. 47, 54-101 (2007).
39. See NAVASKY, supra note 38, at 29 (observing that Attorney General Kennedy "sent
Ramsey Clark, ... on tours of the South to anticipate and prevent violence and assess and promote
the progress of school desegregation"); Mary C. Schneidau, Former AG Defends Hussein Work:
Revered for Principle,Reviled for Clients, Clark Says Fair Trial Is a Right, DALLAS MORNING

NEWS, Dec. 24, 2005, at lA.
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Charles Ogletree, All Too Deliberate, in THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
OF BRoWN V.BOARD OFEDUCATION45, 45-46 (Black Issues in High Educ. ed., 2004).
41. See Lizzy Ratner, Ramsey Clark: Why I'm Taking Saddam's Case, N.Y. OBSERVER, Jan.

10, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.observer.com/node/50299; Interview by Harri Baker with
Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y Gen., in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 11, 1969) [hereinafter Clark Interview
II], available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ClarkR/Clarkr2.pdf.
42. See Clark Interview II, supra note 41 (discussing Clark's role in "creat[ing] a set of
conditions that would ease the admission of Meredith").
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experience, Clark drafted a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on the plane trip
back to Washington suggesting the pressing need for federal civil rights
legislation. 4 3 This memo reportedv provided the impetus for what would
become the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Following President Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963, Vice
President Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency and was elected to that office
in 1964. He elevated Ramsey Clark to the position of Deputy Attorney General
in 1965,45 and in that capacity, Clark continued to exhibit a strong commitment
to civil rights.
In the spring of 1965, he was the principal federal official in charge of the
government's oversight of the historic third civil rights march from Selma to
Montgomery, Alabama.46 Later, in August of that year, Clark was instrumental
in securing passage of the momentous Voting Rights Act of 1965.47 Shortly
thereafter, the Watts race riots erupted, and Clark was assigned the daunting role
of orchestrating the federal government's response. 48 As chair of the President's
Task Force on the Los Angeles Riots (Task Force), Clark conducted a thorough
examination of the riots, including their causes and effects, and ultimately
prepared and issued a lengthy report, graphically documenting the harsh social
and economic realities that contributed to the urban unrest. 49 In conducting his
investigation, Clark witnessed firsthand the social ills that African-American

43. See Josh Saunders, Ramsey Clark's Prosecution Complex: How Did Lyndon Johnson's
Attorney General Come to Defend Dictators, War Criminals,and Terrorists?, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-

Dec. 2003, at 43, 44; Clark Interview II, supra note 41.
44. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 44; Clark Interview II, supra note 41 ("[A]fter I got back
from that trip, ... we had the first meeting in the Attorney General's office on proposals for civil
rights legislation that was introduced later that summer and it became the Civil Rights Act of
1964.").
45. See Clark Interview II, supra note 41. For a brief period before Clark became Deputy
Attorney General, he worked in the White House as some sort of assistant to the President; he had
no official title and never relinquished his position as Assistant Attorney General until he was
officially appointed Deputy Attorney General in February 1965. Interview by Harri Baker with
Ramsey Clark, U.S. Att'y Gen., in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 30, 1968) [hereinafter Clark Interview I],
available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ClarkR/Clarkrl.pdf; Victor S. Navasky, 'Wrong Guy for the Wrong Post at the Wrong Time'?, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Dec. 2, 1967, at 74, 77 (discussing Clark's placement in the White House after
President Johnson's 1964 election and Clark's appointment as Deputy Attorney General in 1965).
46. Clark Interview II, supra note 41; see also John H. Richardson, How the Attorney
Generalof the UnitedStates Became Saddam Hussein's Lawyer, ESQUIRE, Feb. 2007, at 89, 92.

47. See Clark Interview II, supra note 41.
48.

See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, AUGUST

11-15, 1965, at 14 (Sept. 17, 1965) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (on file with the Lyndon
Baines Johnson Library, Task Force Reports, Box 10) (noting that "between August 11 and August
15, South Central Los Angeles was swept by lawless and bloody rioting such as has not been seen
in this country in recent years"); Interview by Harri Baker with Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y
Gen., in Falls Church, Va. (Mar. 21, 1969) [hereinafter Clark Interview III], available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ClarkR/Clark-r3.pdf.
49. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48 (discussing the Watts riots and

recommending reforms).
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citizens were enduring, most of which, to some degree, seemed to emanate from
institutionalized racism. 0 Indeed, at one point, the report tellingly observed that
"the strong feeling of alienation from society held by many of the minority poor,
and the feeling that society's rules, laws, and customs are designed to oppress
them do little to encourage respect . .. for property." 1

President Johnson, however, never released the Task Force report,
apparently because of its relatively unfiltered and uncompromisin 2depiction of
the social and economic situation in South Central Los Angeles.
Without a
doubt, Ramsey Clark's personal witnessing of the harsh and tragic realities
associated with the Watts riots specifically, and the civil rights movement more
generally, armed him with a perspective on race that few white Americans
possessed.53
In September 1966, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach resigned to
assume the position of Under Secretary of State.54 Clark became the Acting
Attorney General, and President Johnson subsequently named Clark as the
Attorney General on March 10, 1967.'" The urban racial unrest that the Watts
riots manifested continued to smolder in the years that followed Clark's
promotion, with riots occurring in Cleveland, Newark, and Detroit, among other
places. 56 In addition, further rioting took place in various cities, including
Washington, D.C., in the aftermath of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. in 1968 .
As Attorney General, Ramsey Clark was extensively

50. See WILKINS, supra note 9, at 172-73 (discussing Clark's meetings with black citizens of
South Central Los Angeles); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 5-13.
51. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 47.
52. See Clark Interview III, supra note 48 ("I think the President made the decision [not to

release the report].... The report didn't pull any punches; it demonstrated the existence of really
immensely difficult problems in the fields of education, employment, housing, health,
communications and public service; it was not tender in its treatment of many important interests.").
53. See, e.g., WILKINS, supra note 9, at 172-73 (discussing Clark's meetings with black
citizens of South Central Los Angeles and observing that "I had never seen a powerful white man
take poor black strangers seriously before. . . . He was more sensitive to the problems of poor
blacks than I imagined any white man could be"); Peter Carlson, The Crusader,WASH. POST, Dec.

15, 2002, at Fl ("[W]atching poor, unarmed black people defy entrenched racism was a lifechanging experience that gave [Clark] a lingering sympathy for dissidents.").
54. Clark Interview I, supranote 45.
55.

RICHARD L. SCHOTT & DAGMAR S. HAMILTON, PEOPLE, POSITIONS, AND POWER: THE

POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 87 (1983); see also Clark Interview I, supra note
45.

56. See Interview by Harri Baker with Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y Gen., in Falls
Church, Va. (Apr. 16, 1969) [hereinafter Clark Interview IV], available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.
edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ClarkR/Clark-r4.pdf.
57.

JOHN T. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT, AND THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL: THE JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960's 112 (1971) ("Dr. King's assassination triggered a wave of rioting in

over a hundred cities, including serious disorders and widespread property destruction in
Washington, D.C., as well as new charges of organized incitement."); see also GEROLD FRANK, AN
AMERICAN DEATH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

AND THE GREATEST MANHUNT OF OUR TIME 119-20 (1972) (stating that Clark received reports of

rioting in Memphis, Nashville, Raleigh, and Washington, D.C.).
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involved in organizing the federal government's efforts to monitor and contain
these volatile situations,5 and he faced escalating social and political pressure to
prosecute black radicals whom many viewed as responsible.59 High on this list
of militant targets was none other than Stokely Carmichael.60
B. Stokely Carmichael: "Hellno, we won't go!"

A native of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, Stokely Standiford Churchill
Carmichael61 moved to the South Bronx in the summer of 1952.62 Intellectually
curious and gifted, Carmichael excelled academically throughout his youth,
notably being one of the few black students chosen for admission to the elite
Bronx High School of Science. 63 After graduating from high school, he chose to
attend Howard University, principally because of his strong attraction to the
sophisticated and politically active Nonviolent Action Group (NAG), an
unofficial student organization at the university that was affiliated with the better
known Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). 64 SNCC had
65
emerged on the civil rights scene in February 1960. Comprised of a younger,
more idealistic and confrontational generation of activists, SNCC focused its
efforts on voter registration drives in the inhospitable South, notably in Lowndes
County, Alabama.

58. See Clark Interview IV, supra note 56.
59. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text. In addition to Carmichael and H. Rap
Brown, members of the Black Panther Party were also the subject of blame for the urban unrest
during the late 1960s, and there were widespread calls for an intense government response to their
reputedly subversive activities. See Brown, supra note 38, at 84. Though the Black Panthers
advocated violence and spoke apocalyptically of the impending "revolution," Ramsey Clark refused
to target them in the manner urged by many powerful figures at that time. Id. He was unwilling "to
blame black militants for riots or to use them as a scapegoat to avoid confronting problems of
poverty and racial discrimination." ELLIFF, supra note 57, at 149. Interestingly, following the
election of President Nixon, Clark's successor as Attorney General, John Mitchell, took a decidedly
more aggressive approach to the Black Panthers. See Brown, supra note 38, at 85.
61. For a discussion of the derivation of his somewhat ostentatious moniker, see STOKELY
CARMICHAEL WITH EKWUEME MICHAEL THELWELL, READY FOR REVOLUTION: THE LIFE AND

STRUGGLES OF STOKELY CARMICHAEL (KwAME TURE) 19-20 (2003).

62.
63.
64.
were also
65.

See id. at 44, 48.
See id. at 73.
See id. at 112-13, 117. Although NAG was essentially a Howard-based group, there
some members who were from other institutions or else not students at all. See id. at 136.
See PENIEL E. JOSEPH, WAITING 'TIL THE MIDNIGHT HOUR: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF

BLACK POWER IN AMERICA 123 (2006) (noting that SNCC was "founded in conjunction with the

spontaneous sit-ins that originated in Greensboro, North Carolina, on February 1, 1960").
66. See id. at 123-24, 127-31. For an in-depth account of Carmichael's and SNCC's heroic
struggles in Lowndes County, see CARMICHAEL WITH THELWELL, supra note 61, at 457-77.
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Carmichael's committed involvement with NAG eventually led to a larger
role within SNCC67-culminating in his election as the organization's chairman
in 1966 through his defeat of future civil rights icon John Lewis. 68 Skeptical of
and disenchanted with the traditional civil rights movement's strategy of
nonviolent resistance, 69 Carmichael was prepared to take the organization in a
decidedly more combative direction.70 Once in charge, he quickly altered
SNCC's image and course, calling for rebellion and violence, if necessary, and
popularizin the controversial "Black Power" mantra and correlative
movement.

67.

See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 124 (noting that after Carmichael's graduation from

Howard in 1964, he "became project director for [SNCC's] voter registration efforts in that year's
Freedom Summer").
68. See generally CARMICHAEL WITH THELWELL, supra note 61, at 479-83 (discussing the
events preceding the election of Carmichael); DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN 523-24 (1998)
(same); LEWIS WITH D'ORSO, supra note 2, at 365-68 (1998) (discussing the election from Lewis's

perspective).
69. For example, in an article Carmichael wrote for the New York Times Review ofBooks, he
maintained:
For too many years, black Americans marched and had their heads broken and got
shot.... After years of this, we are at almost the same point-because we demonstrated
from a position of weakness. We cannot be expected any longer to march and have our
heads broken in order to say to whites: Come on, you're nice guys. For you are not nice
guys. We have found you out.
Stokely Carmichael, What We Want, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 1966, reprinted in STOKELY SPEAKS:
BLACK POWER BACK TO PAN-AFRICANISM 17, 18 (Ethel N. Minor ed., 1971) [hereinafter
Carmichael, What We Want]; see also HALBERSTAM, supra note 68, at 529 ("Nonviolence,

Carmichael said, had taken them as far as they could go.").
70. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 68, at 528 ("The new ideology was clearly that of black
separatism."); JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 130 ("Carmichael's election over the more moderate John
Lewis served as the capstone for SNCC's radical orientation."); LEWIS WITH D'ORSO, supra note 2,

at 368 (maintaining that John Lewis did not consider his loss to Carmichael "so much a repudiation
of [him] as a repudiation of [SNCC], of what we were, of what we stood for").
71. In a speech delivered in 1967 to the Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation in London,
Carmichael proclaimed:
Our history demonstrates that the reward for trying to coexist in peace has been the
physical and psychological murder of our peoples. We have been lynched, our houses
have been bombed and our churches burned. Now we are being shot down like dogs in
the streets by white racist policemen. We can no longer accept this oppression without
retribution.
Stokely Carmichael, The Dialectics of Liberation (July 18, 1967), in STOKELY SPEAKS: BLACK
POWER BACK TO PAN-AFRICANISM 77, 95 (Ethel N. Minor ed., 1971); see also Carmichael, What

We Want, supra note 69, at 21 ("SNCC reaffirms the right of black men everywhere to defend
themselves when threatened or attacked. As for initiating the use of violence, we hope that such
programs as ours will make that unnecessary; but it is not for us to tell black communities whether
they can or cannot use any particular form of action to resolve their problems."); HALBERSTAM,
supranote 68, at 526 ("What fascinated Carmichael ... was nothing less than the idea of revolution
and the use of violence to achieve a revolution."). For a detailed discussion of "Black Power" as
viewed by Carmichael, see STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER:
THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 34-56 (1967).

72. See Kaufman, supra note 2 (noting that following Carmichael's release from his twentyseventh arrest, he began to promote use of the phrase "Black Power": "We been saying 'Freedom'
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In his seminal Black Power speech in Mississippi on June 16, 1966,
following release from his twenty-seventh arrest, Carmichael vehemently
maintained that he was not going to jail anymore and asserted:
We want black power!

...

That's right. That's what we want, black

power. We don't have to be ashamed of it. We have stayed here. We
have begged the president. We've begged the federal governmentthat's all we've been doing, begging and begging. It's time we stand up
and take over. Every courthouse in Mississippi ought to be burned
down tomorrow to get rid of the dirt and the mess. From now on, when
they ask you what you want, you know what to tell 'em. What do you
want?7 3
The crowd obediently responded with shouts of "Black [P]ower!" 7 4
Following this speech, which took place on the heels of the historic continuation
of James Meredith's "March Against Fear" (led by Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Carmichael, and other civil rights notables), 75 the New York Times reported that,
with Stokely Carmichael as its leader, a "new philosophy" of Black Power was

for six years .... What we are going to start saying now is 'Black Power!"'); JOSEPH, supra note
65, at 141-42 (discussing the unveiling of SNCC's "Black Power" slogan in Greenwood,
Mississippi); LEWIS WITH D'ORSO, supra note 2, at 371 (explaining that Carmichael adopted the
phrase "Black Power" after seeing SNCC staffer Willie Ricks excite crowds with the phrase).
73. TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN'S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965-68, at 486
(2006). Carmichael's twenty-seventh arrest was on a charge of trespassing. See Gene Roberts,
MississippiReduces Police Protectionfor Marchers,N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1966, at 1.

74. BRANCH, supra note 73, at 486 (quoting Paul Good, The Meredith March, NEW SOUTH,
Summer 1966, at 2, 8).
75. Meredith made history in 1962 by becoming the first African American to enroll at the
University of Mississippi. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 132 (citing TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 647-53 (1988))

(discussing the

controversy associated with Meredith's enrollment); Brown, supra note 38, at 60 (discussing
Ramsey Clark's monitoring of Meredith's admission on behalf of the Department of Justice); supra
note 42 and accompanying text. On June 5, 1966, Meredith embarked upon a solitary "March
Against Fear" to symbolically inspire black citizens out of their fearful states of mind with regard to
the exercise of constitutional rights. JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 132-33 (citing DAVID J. GARROw,
BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE 475 (1986); Roy Reed, Meredith is Shot in Back on Walk into Mississippi, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1966, at 1; Roy Reed, Meredith Regrets He Was Not Armed, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,

1966, at 1). The march began in Memphis, Tennessee and was to conclude in Jackson, Mississippi;
however, on the second day of his quest, Meredith was shot. JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 133.
Although he would fully recover, he could not continue with his march at that time; therefore, Dr.
King, Stokely Carmichael, and many others did so for him. Id. at 133-34 (citing Civil Rights: The
New Racism, TIME, July 1, 1966, at 11). Meredith rejoined the march on June 25 and completed it
on the following day at the Mississippi State Capitol Building. Id. at 144-45 (citing GARROW,
supra, at 487; Meredith Says F.B.I. Watched Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1966, at 21; Meredith
Will Fly to South on Friday to Resume March, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1966, at 24; Roberts, supra
note 73, at 1; Meredith Leads the March on Eve ofRally in Jackson,N.Y. TIES, June 26, 1966, at
1; Tactics ofMarch DisturbMeredith, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1966, at 35).
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"sweeping the civil rights movement." 76 "Reporters and cameramen drawn to a
demonstration by the magic of Dr. King's name stay[ed] to write about and
photograph Mr. Carmichael...

."

And this was only the beginning.

In the year and a half that followed, Stokely Carmichael became a force to
be reckoned with in the civil rights movement' and more broadly within the
expanding antiwar context. 79 He was resolute in his general opposition to the
Vietnam War but was adamant that blacks should take no part whatsoever in
what he considered to be a racist conflict.80 During New York's Spring
Mobilization antiwar rally in 1967, which featured such distinguished
personalities as Dr. King and Dr. Benjamin Spock, Carmichael stole the show
with his caustic indictment of America's involvement in Vietnam and
unequivocal advocacy of black draft resistance:
We maintain that America's cry of "preserve freedom in the world" is a
hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation movements which
are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the United States' cold war
policies. We see no reason for black men, who are daily murdered
physically and mentally in this country, to go and kill yellow people
abroad, who have done nothing to us and are, in fact, victims of the
same oppression. We will not support LBJ's racist war in Vietnam.81
On a separate occasion, Carmichael pointedly highlighted the hypocrisy and
audacity of the government's enlisting of black men to fight in Vietnam-"Hell,
no. We won't go. They expect us to run in Harlem and fight in Hanoi? They
must be crazy." 82 On another occasion, Carmichael sharply observed that:
"Even if I believed the lies of [President] Johnson, that we're fighting to give

76. BRANCH, supra note 73, at 494 (quoting Gene Roberts, Rights March Disunity:
Campaign in Mississippi Emphasized a New 'Black Consciousness' Force, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28,
1966, at 23).
77. Id.

78. See id. at 495 ("Black power was hot, whether or not it would last. King was too Sunday
School, and he no longer commanded attention at the White House."); JOSEPH, supra note 65, at

146 ("Carmichael emerged from Mississippi as the spokesman for a generation of black radicals.").
79. One commentator suggested that 1967 could aptly be described as the "Year of Stokely
Carmichael" and observed that during this period, he became "one of the country's most vocal
antiwar activists."

Peniel E. Joseph, Black Power 's Powerful Legacy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.

(D.C.), July 21, 2006, at B6; see also Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 53 ("It is
sometimes ironic that many of the peace groups have begun to call SNCC violent and say they can
no longer support us, when we are in fact the most militant organization for peace or civil rights or
human rights against the war in Vietnam in this country today.").
80. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 180-81 (quoting Why SNCC Says 'Hell No!' to Viet War,
MUHAMMAD SPEAKS, Apr. 28, 1967, at 5).
81. Id. (quoting Why SNCC says 'Hell No!'to Viet War, supra note 80, at 5.)

82. Photograph of Carmichael speaking to students in Hampton, Virginia, in CARMICHAEL
WITH THELWELL, supra note 61, following p. 500; see also BRANCH, supra note 73, at 608 ("At

Tougaloo ... Carmichael's strong anti-Vietnam statements set off almost five minutes of chanting,
'We ain't going, hell no!' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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democracy to the people in Vietnam, as a black man living in this country I
wouldn't fight to give this to anybody."83 In the same speech, he also targeted
his ire directly towards black men who acquiesced to the government's call to
fight in Vietnam:
Any black man fighting in the war in Vietnam is nothing but a black
mercenary. Any time a black man leaves the country where he can't
vote to supposedly deliver the vote to somebody else, he's a black
mercenary. Any time a black man leaves this country, gets shot in
Vietnam on foreign ground, and returns home and you won't give him a
burial place in his own homeland, he's a black mercenary.84
Contrary to the peaceful opposition language that many within the antiwar
movement employed, Carmichael's rhetoric was ominously tinged with
endorsements of violence in the aid of resistance.85 For example, at the birthday
benefit for imprisoned Black Panther Party co-founder and Minister of Defense
Huey P. Newton, 86 Carmichael stated:
For us the question is not going to Vietnam any more, the question is
how we can protect our brothers who do not go to Vietnam from going
to jail so that when one brother says "Hell, no," there're enough people
in that community around him, so that if they dare come in, they are
going to face maximum damage in their community.87
While noted for his oratorical skills, it is important to stress that Carmichael
did not merely "talk the talk" in opposing the Vietnam War; he literally put his
words into action. For example, on one occasion he personally escorted fellow

83. Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 53. In a similar vein, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. observed the irony of the government sending black men "eight thousand miles away to
guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East
Harlem." Martin Luther King, Jr., Why I Am Opposed to the War in Vietnam (Apr. 30, 1967),
available at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/pacificaviet/riversidetranscript.html.
84. Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 53.
85.
86.

See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 181.
Stokely Carmichael, Free Huey (Feb. 17, 1968), in STOKELY SPEAKS: BLACK POWER

BACK TO PAN-AFRICANISM 111, 111 (Ethel N. Minor ed., 1971) [hereinafter Carmichael, Free
Huey]. Newton faced the death penalty in connection with the alleged first-degree murder of an
Oakland, California police officer. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 206. He was also charged with
assaulting another officer. See id. at 237-38. His perceived wrongful imprisonment inspired
somewhat of a movement unto itself to "Free Huey." For a discussion of the nature of and events
associated with the "Free Huey" effort, see id. at 221-26, 229-32. The jury ultimately convicted
Newton of voluntary manslaughter and acquitted him on the assault charge. Id. at 237-38.
87. Carmichael, Free Huey, supra note 86, at 126; see also JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 151
("Declaring that Black Power meant the destruction of 'Western Civilization,' [Carmichael] urged
black men to refuse to serve in Vietnam."); cf id. at 148 (recounting "Carmichael's insistence that
discussion of nonviolence in the movement be tabled as long as 'the United States continues to
commit violence in Vietnam."').
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SNCC leader Cleveland Sellers to his Army induction ceremony, at which
Sellers famously refused induction.
Carmichael's hip, militant, and mesmerizing oratory, combined with his
innate charisma and good looks, transformed him into a veritable rock star
within the civil rights (Black Power) and antiwar movements. 89 His irreverent
contempt for the white power structure and persistent calls for effecting change
through the exertion of Black Power90 inspired awestruck blacks but alarmed
many whites, 91 including President Lyndon Johnson.92
In fact, President Johnson became somewhat fixated on Carmichael and
viewed him as one of his principal antagonists on both the civil rights9 3 and
Vietnam War fronts.94 He even went so far as to demand regular weekly reports
from the FBI concerning Carmichael's conduct. 95 Moreover, Johnson's growing

88. See BRANCH, supra note 73, at 605 (discussing Sellers' refusal and noting Carmichael's
whispered words of encouragement-"Don't let them get you."); CARICHAEL WITH THELWELL,
supra note 61, at 519 (recounting Sellers's reaction to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous antiVietnam speech at Riverside Church in New York and noting that "[b]efore the dust settled, Cleve
[Sellers] would do time for refusing to go to Vietnam").
89. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 150 ("Television and print media found a fascinating
persona in the handsome activist."); Joseph, supra note 79, at B6 ("Carmichael was tall, handsome,
intellectually agile, and equal parts angry and gregarious, carrying himself... with an air of
unadorned dignity and grace that helped turn him into an international icon: black power's rock
star.").
90. See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 145 ("The movement, [Carmichael] said, had to build
a political base so powerful that blacks would 'bring them [whites] to their knees every time they
mess with us."' (alteration in original) (quoting CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND
THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s 211 (3d prtg. 2000))).
91. See, e.g., HALBERSTAM, supra note 68, at 529 ("Nothing, ... would alienate the white
middle class, which the Movement needed for political and financial support, more quickly than a
cry of black power. It might have [had] a certain legitimacy, ... but the sound of it to ordinary
whites after a decade in which the rhetoric had been based on Christian charity seemed ominous and
threatening .... ); JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 150 ("Carmichael began to inspire a mixture of
admiration and revulsion that rivaled the memory of Malcolm X."); id. at 162 ("'Ifscaring whites is
an art,' wrote one reporter, 'Carmichael seems well on his way to becoming a master."' (quoting
Gene Roberts, The Story ofSnick: From 'FreedomHigh' to 'BlackPower,'N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept.
25, 1966, at 27, 128)); id. at 178 (citing 'Black Power' in Nashville, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1967, at
46) ("Critics charged that Carmichael was a one-man army, traveling around the country leaving
insurrection and disorder in his wake.").
92. See JOSEPH, supranote 65, at 159 (citing Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir. of the
F.B.I., to Special Agents in Charge of the Atlanta, N.Y.C., and Wash. Field Offices (Aug. 18,
1966), available at http://foia.fbi.gov/carmichael stokely/carmichael stokely_part02.pdf) (noting
that Johnson's concerns about Carmichael led to enhanced FBI surveillance of Carmichael's
activities).
93. See id. at 166 (observing that Johnson attributed his inability to secure the passage of new
civil rights legislation to both Carmichael and Black Power).
94. See id. at 179 (indicating that Carmichael's outspoken opposition to U.S. involvement in
Vietnam garnered "the attention of both the White House and the Justice Department").
95. See id. at 159 (quoting Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach, Deputy Dir. of the F.B.I., to
Clyde Tolson (Aug. 10, 1966), available at http://foia.fbi.gov/carmichael stokely/carmichael
stokelypart0l.pdf) (observing that Johnson's special assistant requested the provision of updates
"at least several times a week" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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frustration over the escalating unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the
increasing prevalence of rioting as an apparent mode of civil rights protest
caused him to push for the prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, among others. 9 6
Interestingly, the proposed ground for prosecution that the President and his
cabinet advocated was "conspiracy to incite riots" rather than antiwar-related
97
Several members of Congress, however, openly pressed for an
charges.
indictment based on violation of draft laws, 98 as did many citizens. 99
In addition to, and perhaps in aid of, calls for the criminal prosecution of
Stokely Carmichael, the FBI and even Vice President Hubert Humphrey sought
to employ enhanced microphone surveillance of his activities. 100 After Assistant

96. See id. at 166 ("Johnson's private solution [to his concern that he was losing the support
of white Americans, was] to 'do something to shake them up like convict that damn Carmichael and
uphold it' .... ); WILKINS, supra note 9, at 207 ("[I]t seemed clear that there was a good deal of
pressure on the Department of Justice to find some way to put Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael
in jail."); Interview by Harri Baker with Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y Gen., in Falls Church,
Va. (June 3, 1969) [hereinafter Clark Interview V], available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnso
n/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ClarkR/Clark-r5.pdf (recalling that President Johnson "was
outraged by Carmichael" and "thought it would be very good for the country if we could stop
[him]").
97. See Michael Flamm, The "Long Hot Summer" and the Politics of Law and Order, in
LOOKING BACK AT LBJ 128, 136 (Mitchell B. Lerner ed., 2005) ("The 2 August meeting of the
cabinet exposed other deep divisions within the White House.... The issue that generated the most
heated exchanges, however, was whether black radicals like Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown
had incited the riots."); infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text. While Ramsey Clark expressed
the sentiment that there was insufficient evidence to pursue a case against Carmichael or Rap
Brown, President Johnson was not prepared to concede the point yet. See Minutes of President
Johnson's Cabinet Meeting of August 2, 1967, at 3-4 (on file with author) [hereinafter Cabinet
Minutes] (discussing the possible prosecution of "outside agitators," such as Carmichael, for
conspiracy to incite riots).
98. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 155 (observing that Democratic Congressman Mendel
Rivers questioned whether Carmichael's anti-Vietnam War diatribes violated the Universal Military
Training and Service Act). An antiwar speech that Carmichael delivered in Cleveland, Ohio led its
Democratic congressman to request prosecution for flouting the nation's draft laws. Id. at 151-52.
Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi apparently raised the issue in a telegram to Ramsey Clark
on October 31, 1966, in reference to certain comments made by Stokely Carmichael, see Eastland
Letter, supra note 9, most likely in a speech delivered at the University of California, Berkeley. See
Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 45-60. In response to the telegram, Assistant
Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, Jr. essentially maintained that there was no evidence to suggest
that Carmichael's words had crossed into the area of speech unprotected by the First Amendment,
and therefore, prosecution under the Universal Military Training and Service Act was not possible
at that time. See Eastland Letter, supra note 9.
99. See, e.g., Letter from F.W. Ferguson to President Lyndon B. Johnson (May 17, 1967) (on
file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Box 79, "Carmichael,
Stokely" (file 1 of 2)) ("If [Carmichael's anti-Vietnam Rhetoric] is not interfering with the draft and
is not giving aid and comfort to our enemies then I do not understand the English language.");
Letter from R.W. Hickman to President Lyndon B. Johnson (May 19, 1967) (on file with the
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Box 79, "Carmichael, Stokely" (file 1
of 2)) ("I heard Stokely Carmichael's tirade Wednesday, degrading the President of these United
States and advocating refusal to serve in the Armed Services. . . . If Carmichael is allowed to
persist, you will certainly see a civil war here in our time.").
100. See JOSEPH, supranote 65, at 164-65, 168-69.
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FBI Director Deke DeLoach informed Humphrey of certain public remarks by
Carmichael, which included insults of prominent White House officials and
expressions of open opposition to the draft, Humphrey reacted sharply. 101 He
was "'sick and tired' of hearing about Carmichael" and issued a directive,
through DeLoach, to Ramsey Clark that he approve the wiretap. 102
In general, Clark fervently opposed wiretapping and, throughout his tenure
as Attorney General, consistently thwarted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's
efforts in this regard. 103 Thus, it was not surprising that Clark resisted permitting
microphone surveillance of Stokely Carmichael.
He offered specific reasons
for his reluctance. The first, ironically, was because of the potential for
imminent criminal prosecution of Carmichael.10 5 Perhaps more significantly,
Clark expressed the view that Carmichael's notoriety as a civil rights leader, as
well as the possible recriminations that might flow from a leak regarding such
surveillance, presented too great of a risk. 10
As such, Clark held fast to his stance concerning surveillance of Carmichael,
resisting the strong desires of other members of the Johnson Administration. He
likewise rebuffed the potent calls for Carmichael's criminal prosecution.
III. RAMSEY CLARK'S REFUSAL TO PROSECUTE STOKELY CARMICHAEL

A. Impetus Behind Callsfor Prosecution
Admittedly, Stokely Carmichael's confrontational approach to securing civil
rights for black citizens was distasteful to many white leaders, especially
President Johnson. 107 He clearly preferred dealing with the more traditional civil
rights leaders of the old guard, such as NAACP President Roy Wilkins and
Urban League Chair Whitney Young, who were very supportive of and
cooperative with his Administration. 108 Johnson was extraordinarily sympathetic

101. See id. at 168-69.
102. Id. at 169.
103. See RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 38 (1970) ("Clark was deeply suspicious about both the usefulness of this kind of
snooping and the motives of the people who wanted to use it."); NAVASKY, supra note 38, at 83
("Ramsey Clark ... opposed wiretapping except in national-security cases."); Brown, supra note
38, at 65 (discussing Clark's opposition to Hoover's electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King,
Jr.).
104. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 165.
105. See id.
106. See id.

107. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text; Clark Interview V, supra note 96
(recalling that Johnson was "outraged by Carmichael").
108. See, e.g., Steven F. Lawson, Civil Rights, in EXPLORING THE JOHNSON YEARS 93, 108

(Robert A. Divine ed., 1981) ("Vietnam and the riots isolated the President from black radicals, but
drew him closer to such moderates as Wilkins and Young.").
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to the plight of black citizens 109 and was concededly working with these leaders
to enhance the status of blacks in America, albeit at a somewhat patient,
measured pace. 110 Carmichael and other principals of the new guard, however,
were convinced that the only way to achieve equal stature in American society
was through the establishment and assertion of Black Power, which included
resorting to violence, if necessary. 1
Johnson viewed Carmichael's less palatable style as a significant
impediment to Johnson's efforts to push his civil rights agenda.1 12 Whites felt
threatened and angry, and these emotions translated into reticence on the part of
elected officials in Washington.113 Furthermore, the urban racial unrest that
seethed in major metropolitan areas in the years following the Watts riots114 was
popularly attributed to militant black leaders, such as Carmichael, H. Rap
Brown, and others within the burgeoning Black Power movement.1 15
Equally disturbing, from the perspective of President Johnson, was
Carmichael's blatant, vocal disdain for the Vietnam War.116 By 1967, Johnson
appeared more committed than ever to achieving victory in Vietnam.117 The

109. See BRANCH, supra note 73, at 113 (recounting portions of Johnson's famous address on
voting rights in which he stated, "There is no Negro problem,.. . there is only an American
problem, and we are met here tonight as Americans ... to solve that problem" (quoting Lyndon B.
Johnson, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, in 1 PUB.
PAPERS 281, 282 (March 15, 1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); HALBERSTAM, supra note
68, at 479 ("Johnson was becoming, unlike his cooler predecessor, something of a genuine activist
for the black cause. . . .").
110. See, e.g., WILKINS, supranote 9, at 205-07 (stating that Johnson told a gathering ofblack
civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young, that "they
had to be patient. All the things that had to be done couldn't be done at once.").
111. See supranotes 69-73 and accompanying text.
112. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 161-62 (quoting John Herbers, Rights Backers Fear a

Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1966, at 1) (discussing the undermining effects of Black Power on
Johnson's social agenda). Johnson attributed his inability to secure the passage of new civil rights
legislation to both Carmichael and the Black Power movement. Id. at 166.
113. See, e.g., id. at 162 ("If political fatigue over race relations threatened to hinder
legislative breakthroughs, it also suggested 'at least the possibility that the nation [was] moving into
a vicious cycle in which Negroes riot[ed] because whites [did] not do enough and whites [did] not
do enough because Negroes riot[ed]'(quoting Herbers, supra note 112, at 1)).
114. See Brown, supra note 38, at 61-64 (discussing Ramsey Clark's investigation into the
Watts Riots and noting the subsequent racial unrest that emerged in other areas of the country in the
riots' aftermath); supranotes 56-57 and accompanying text.
115. See O'Meara,supra note 5, at 1109 ("[Carmichael] seems to breed riots; they follow in
his train."); Robert E. Baskin, Tower Urges Removal of Ramsey Clark, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Apr. 27, 1968, at lA ("The cities of our nation, ... are being burned not by 12-year-olds but by
bandits, looters and arsonists who are potential mass murderers, reacting to the agitation of the
Stokely Carmichaels and H. Rap Browns of our society." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116. See BRANCH, supra note 73, at 451 ("The dissenters unhinged Johnson. To him, they
undermined the tenuous hopes for military success without offering an honest alternative, which
made them disloyal, impractical, and unprincipled all at once.").
117. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. HUNT, LYNDON JOHNSON'S WAR 110 (1996) ("The tonnage of

bombs dropped reflected the rising ferocity of the attack, increasing from 63,000 in 1965 to 226,000
in 1967."); ROBERT S. MCNAMARA wiTH BRIAN VANDEMARK, IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY
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War's rising unpopularity was having a devastating effect on his potential
legacy, which fueled an almost maniacal obsession with the conflict. 18 Johnson
came to view any opposition to the War as a personal affront, 119 and he had
absolutely no tolerance for antiwar activists who promoted draft evasion.120
Carmichael, therefore, represented a sharp thorn in the President's side-one that
he desperately wanted removed. 1 2 1 An effective method for doing so seemed to
be a successful federal criminal prosecution.122
While a potential charge against Carmichael under the SSA for knowingly
aiding and abetting draft evasion would appear to have been a logical and viable
basis for prosecution, this was not the crime for which Carmichael was
investigated. Instead, President Johnson pushed for, and Ramsey Clark
concentrated his investigation upon, a possible indictment for conspiracy to
incite a riot.
B. Conspiracyto Incite a Riot

The dramatic shift within the civil rights movement from peaceful
nonviolence to militant, aggressive calls for Black Power was viewed by many
as a ma or contributor to the disturbing race riots of the "long, hot summer" of
1967.12 There were certainly other plausible explanations for the tumultuous
events of that period. Specifically, the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (better known as the "Kerner Commission")-which the President
charged with the task of investigating the causes of the riots-concluded (much

AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM 321 (1995) (indicating that the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam

increased from 184,300 in December 1965 to 485,600 in December 1967).
118. See, e.g., GEORGE C. HERRING, LBJ AND VIETNAM 135-50 (1994) (discussing the

Johnson Administration's efforts to "sell the war" to the public and highlighting Johnson's
"[h]ypersensitiv[ity] to the political implications of anything that concerned the war," which fueled
an obsession with trying to control public opinion).
119. See, e.g., DAVID MARANISS,

THEY MARCHED INTO SUNLIGHT: WAR AND PEACE,

VIETNAM AND AMERICA, OCTOBER 1967, at 314 (2003) (noting that Johnson "had become nearly as

obsessed with the targets of protest as with the bombing targets around Hanoi"). Johnson was
enraged over the October 20, 1967 anti-draft demonstration at the Department of Justice, during
which almost 1,000 draft cards were delivered. Id. at 455-57.
120. See, e.g., id. at 455 ("Columnist Joseph Alsop, who supported the war and detested the
protesters . . . was ushered in when Johnson wanted to leak raw intelligence reports detailing the
ribald sexuality or political recklessness of antiwar partisans."); Lawson, supra note 108, at 109
("Public opposition to the Vietnam War soured King's relationship with Johnson.").
121. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 73, at 629 (noting that upon receiving a secret report that
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Stokely Carmichael were opposing the Vietnam War for allegedly
ulterior reasons, Johnson "urged [the FBI] to arrange leaks against Carmichael but not King").
122. See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 166 (noting that Johnson's private solution to the ills
of his presidency was to convict Carmichael).
123. See Flamm, supra note 97, at 128; Baskin, supra note 115, at lA (quoting Senator John
Tower, who blamed the riots throughout the nation on "the agitation of the Stokely Carmichaels and
H. Rap Browns of our society").
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to Johnson's chagrin) that the unrest had been fueled by "systemic racism,
unemployment, and police brutality." 24
Nevertheless, it was superficially difficult to dismiss the potential
connection that existed between the rebellious oratory of Stokely Carmichael and
H. Rap Brown, among others, and these volatile urban uprisings. 125 When
combined with the reality that casting blame on such "rabble rousers" seemed
like a much more satisfying and politically astute strategy, it is easy to
understand why various leaders viewed prosecution of Carmichael and Brown as
an efficacious solution.12 6
During a notably intense Cabinet meeting on August 2, 1967, the principal
topic for discussion was the issue of whether Carmichael and Brown could be
indicted on federal charges for conspiracy to incite riots. 12 7 In his report to the
Cabinet regarding the recent riots in Detroit and elsewhere, Ramsey Clark
concluded that there was "no hard evidence of a Negro conspiracy." 128 Though
he conceded, "we know there are lots of leaders and roving trouble-makers[J" he
attributed much of the severity of the unrest to overreactions by "irres onsible
officials"-"There is panic ... fear ... overreaction and deadly error."1 2
Secretary of State Dean Rusk retorted somewhat incredulously: "Don't we
have any remedy for these people?" 130 Clark responded by noting that the
Justice Department was closely following both Carmichael and Brown but
reiterated that there was no basis for prosecuting either of them.131 Despite the

124. JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 226; see also id. at 226-27 ("[T]he Kerner Commission's
report was the last thing that Lyndon Johnson wanted to hear."); NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH,

SOME OF IT WAS FUN: WORKING WITH RFK AND LBJ 175 (2008) ("[The Watts Riots were] a
spontaneous reaction to years of being second-class citizens, to not having jobs, [and] to living in de
facto segregated ghettos.").
125. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 73, at 633 ("Black power enthusiasts fed speculation with
competitive rhetoric ....

Brown coined ...

demonic slander: 'Violence is necessary.

an epigram that gripped the country as truism or

It is as American as cherry pie."' (quoting Ben A.

Franklin, S.N. CC. Head Advises Negroes in Washington to Get Guns: Burning Capital Urged, If

Needed, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1967, at 14)); id. at 634 (observing that on the heels of the Detroit
riots, Carmichael stated, "[w]e are preparing groups of urban guerillas for our defense in the cities."
(quoting Memorandum from John Edgar Hoover, Dir. of the FBI, to Mildred Stegall, White House
Staff (July 28, 1967) (on file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Office Files of Mildred
Stegall, Box 73B))); JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 188 (quoting CARSON, supra note 90, at 255) (noting
that during the height of the social unrest, Brown gave "a fiery speech, . . . call[ing] for an
escalation of black liberation politics, [and] explicitly sanctioning guerilla warfare as a political
tactic. 'IfAmerica don't come around,' he warned, 'we are going to bum it down!').
126. See Cabinet Minutes, supranote 97, at 5-6.
127. See Flamm, supra note 97, at 136 (citing Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 4).
128. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
McPherson Interview, supranote 16 ("[Clark had the entire Justice Department virtually, even guys
down in the Land[s] Division, researching the record on Rap Brown and on Stokely Carmichael,
trying to find definitive evidence that they had in fact incited to riot .... And he couldn't find it.").
129. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. See id. ("A poll of Justice Department lawyers showed agreement that there was no basis
to prosecute." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

But see HARRY MCPHERSON, A POLITICAL
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fact that a conviction might have been possible at the trial level,132 according to
Clark, it would surely have been overturned on appeal, which would have only
served to further elevate Carmichael's and Brown's statures.133 Various Cabinet
members nevertheless persisted in their calls for prosecution. John Gardner,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, rhetorically asked: "Surely there
must be a limit to what a man can say?" 134 Secretary Rusk chimed in: "What
about Carmichael's threat on the President's life-isn't that enough?" 135
In the end, the bottom line seemed to be that as unsettling as Carmichael's
and Brown's words and methods may have been to many, they simply did not
rise to the level of conspiracy to incite a riot.13 6 Indeed, the President's Cabinet,
Clark included, ultimately acknowledged that local law may have presented the
most viable option for pursuing Carmichael and Brown-"It isn't the end of the
road to say that we can't prosecute Brown and Carmichael.... The local laws
can catch them .

".137

President Johnson, however, remained hesitant to abandon completely the
conspiracy theory at this point: "I don't want to foreclose the conspiracy theory
now.... Keep that door open.... Even though some of you will not agree with
me, I have a very deep feeling that there is more to that than we see at the
moment."1 3 8 Although he eventually acquiesced to Ramsey Clark's position
concerning the prosecution of Carmichael, Johnson and others within his
Administration never fully embraced that decision. 139

EDUCATION 363 (1972) ("Given the public's animosity against Carmichael, an indictment for
inciting to riot seemed assured.").
132. See Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 5; Clark Interview V, supra note 96 ("[I]t would
have been very easy to strike out at Carmichael without a case . . . .").
133. See MCPHERSON, supra note 131, at 363 ("[T]he evidence for conviction was not there,
and acquittal, Clark believed, would exalt Carmichael as nothing else."); McPherson Interview,
supranote 16 ("[Clark] was afraid that he would haul them up in Court and any competent judge, or
certainly a Court of Appeals, would reverse or acquit them.").
134. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
136. See Clark Interview V, supra note 96 ("I think [President Johnson] was outraged by
Carmichael .... I think he thought it would be very good for the country if we could stop that. My
position was just a legal position. We didn't have the facts that as applied to the law demonstrate[d]
guilt of any crime.").
137. Cabinet Minutes, supranote 97, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Frustration over
the inability to federally prosecute Stokely Carmichael for his alleged involvement with the riots
helped inspire subsequent legislation specifically designed to cover "inciteful" activities, such as his
and Brown's. Indeed, the Anti-Riot Act of 1968, see 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2006), which was enacted
as a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, was originally referred to interchangeably as the "Stokely
Carmichael Act" or the "Rap Brown Act."
REBEL 198 (1992).

See MARTY JEZER, ABBIE HOFFMAN: AMERICAN

138. Cabinet Minutes, supra note 97, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. See MCPHERSON, supra note 131, at 363 ("[McPherson] was worried that unless
Carmichael were prosecuted the government, with its commitment to peaceful change, would be
made a goat ....
Johnson had the same concern, but he abided Clark's judgment."); WILKINS,
supra note 9, at 204 (describing Ramsey Clark as "the guy Johnson was furious at because he
wouldn't put Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael in jail"); Flamm, supranote 97, at 136 (observing
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Given this, it is difficult to understand why the focus of Carmichael's
criminal investigation was limited to - conspiracy
to incite riots. 140 There seemed
to have been more than ample evidence to support a charge for aiding and
abetting "another to refuse or evade registration or service" in violation of
Section 462 of the SSA.141 Why did Clark not pursue Carmichael on this basis,
particularly in light of Clark's contemporaneous prosecution of the Boston Five
on a similar ground? An objective comparison of the evidence against the
Boston Five and Carmichael suggests that a decision to prosecute him would
have been equally, if not more, justified.
C. Aiding and Abetting Draft Evasion: Stokely Carmichael v. The Boston
Five

Section 462 of the SSA is a comprehensive provision that, among other
things, makes it unlawful for any person to evade or refuse "registration or
service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this [Act], or [to]
knowingly counself[, aid[, or abet[] another to refuse or evade registrationor
service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this [Act] ....

Violation of the Act subjects offenders to possible "imprisonment for not more
than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or ... both." 143
In a 1967 article in the American Bar Association Journal, University of

Notre Dame Law School Dean Joseph O'Meara staunchly advocated for the
prosecution of Stokely Carmichael for his anti-Vietnam War activities.144
O'Meara drew comparisons to the earlier successful prosecutions in Schenck v.

that Johnson privately expressed "his deep disappointment with Clark" to his senior domestic policy
aide, Joseph Califano); McPherson Interview, supra note 16 (opining that Clark "made the wrong
judgment" and "should have shown that he was really after [those] birds, but he conveyed exactly
the opposite impression").
It should be noted that Rap Brown was eventually prosecuted and convicted for traveling
across state lines with a firearm while the subject of a felony indictment in Maryland. He was
sentenced to five years in prison. See Clark Interview IV, supra note 56. Brown, now known as
Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin, is currently serving a life sentence for homicide. See David Firestone,
Ex-Black Militant Gets Life for MurderingDeputy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A20.

140. There was apparently some discussion of prosecuting Carmichael for treason under the
1917 Sedition Act following controversial visits to Cuba and Hanoi, among other places, during
which he was highly critical of the United States. See Drew Pearson & Jack Anderson, LBJ-Clark
Differ on Handling Stokely, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1967, at Bll.

While President Johnson

contended that Carmichael's "prosecution would put other militants on notice that there is a limit to
treasonous activities against the United States," Ramsey Clark maintained that this would only serve
to make Carmichael a martyr. Id.
141. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1990); see also O'Meara,supra note 5, at 1107-10 (discussing the
existence of a case for Carmichael's prosecution under § 462).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. See O'Meara,supra note 5, at 1109-10.
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United States145 and United States v. Millerl46 for conduct akin to Carmichael's,
and maintained that if those defendants could be prosecuted for their actions,
Carmichael's prosecution should have been a foregone conclusion. 147 In
particular, according to O'Meara, "Carmichael's language [was] more violent,
more provocative, more likely to inflame young men against conscription and to
defy the draft than the statements made by Schenck and Miller."148 Though the
acerbic tone and overtly anti-Communist theme of the Dean's article undermined
its credibility,149 his substantive position was certainly not without some merit.
Stokely Carmichael unabashedly challenged young men to stand up to the
American government and to refuse to participate in the Vietnam War. 15 He
was the very embodiment of the anti-Vietnam and anti draft movement, the
standard bearer for the war resisters' mantra-"Hell no, we won't go!" 51 His
antiwar rhetoric was even stronger with respect to black men.152 In Carmichael's
view, no one should fight in "LBJ's racist war," 153 but black men, especially, had
no business taking up arms abroad for the sake of democracy when they were not
afforded equal access to so-called democratic freedoms at home1 54 and, indeed,
were the subject of unequal treatment and overt racism within the military
itself.'ss

Plainly, if anyone should have been prosecuted for aiding and abetting draft
evasion or conspiracy to do so-a legitimately debatable proposition-it was
Stokely Carmichael. Nevertheless, Ramsey Clark appears to have never

145. 249 U.S. 47, 48-49, 53 (1919) (convicting defendants of conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act by obstructing recruitment and enlistment efforts of the United States military during
a time of war).
146. 233 F.2d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (convicting defendant of knowingly
counseling others to violate the Universal Military Training and Service Act).
147. O'Meara, supra note 5, at 1109. But see Kelman, supra note 10, at 164-66 (offering a
strong rebuttal to O'Meara's arguments for Carmichael's prosecution).
148. O'Meara, supra note 5, at 1109. Notably, though O'Meara discusses the substance of
Schenck's printed commentary, he provides no details regarding Miller. See id. at 1108 (quoting
Miller, 233 F.2d at 171); Kelman, supra note 10, at 165 (citing Miller, 233 F.2d at 171; O'Meara,
supranote 5, at 1108) (noting the absence of any particulars concerning Miller's offense).
149. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 10, at 164 ("[T]he tone of Dean O'Meara's call for Stokely
Carmichael's scalp ... and the texture of his argument-a salmagundi of law, fact, innuendo,
choplogic, and flagwaving-are uncomfortably evocative of the early 1950's."); O'Meara, supra
note 5, at 1107-08 (maintaining that Carmichael and Martin Luther King, Jr. were Communists, or
at least Communist sympathizers, that only "weep[ed] for the enemy").
150. See supranotes 78-80 and accompanying text.
151. See Joseph, supra note 79, at B7.
152. See supranotes 81-87 and accompanying text.
153. See JOSEPH, supra note 65, at 180-81 (quoting Why SNCC Says 'Hell No!' to Viet War,

supranote 80, at 5).
154. See supranotes 82-83 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., WALLACE TERRY, BLOODS: BLACK VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM WAR: AN

ORAL HISTORY 186 (2006) (maintaining that "institutional racism" existed within the Navy during
the Vietnam War); id. at 213 (observing that most blacks in Vietnam "were put in the jobs that were
the most dangerous, the hardest, or just the most undesirable").

HeinOnline -- 62 S. C. L. Rev. 24 2010-2011

2010]

PROSECUTORIAL INDISCRETION

25

seriously considered pursuing him in this regard.156 Instead, he opted to
prosecute five far less volatile anti-Vietnam activists for their "aiding and
abetting" activities.157 The gist of the charges was that the defendants "did
unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree
together and with each other ... to unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully counsel,
aid and abet" various violations of the SSA by Selective Service registrants,
including their evasion of service in the armed forces.158 Nicknamed the Boston
Five because of their Boston-based prosecution in the federal district court in
Massachusetts, 15 9 the group consisted of five respected white men who had
independently undertaken active, peaceful opposition to the Vietnam War.16 0
Defendant Mitchell Goodman was a novelist and professorl61 who was
instrumental in organizing two of the most critical events that led to the charges
brought against the Boston Five. The first event was a major press conference
held on October 2, 1967 (Overt Act No. 2 of the indictment), orchestrated to
publicize all of the anti-draft activities that were taking place.162 In addition,
Goodman was the principal force behind a demonstration on October 20, 1967
(Overt Act No. 11), during which a briefcase full of draft cards and other draftrelated materials was delivered to the Department of Justice. 163

156. Interview with Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y Gen., in Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 17, 2009) ("It
never occurred to me to think of him in the draft case. I had to think of him in terms of his own
activity. . . ."). Dean O'Meara suggests in his article that the Department of Justice considered
prosecuting Carmichael on this charge but concluded that "no violation [had] occurred." O'Meara,
supra note 5, at 1109. However, the only support for this contention that the author could locate
was a single, unsigned letter dated November 2, 1966, from Assistant Attorney General Fred M.
Vinson, Jr. to Senator James 0. Eastland, responding to an inquiry by Senator Eastland regarding
the possible prosecution of Stokely Carmichael under the Universal Military Training and Service
Act. See Eastland Letter, supra note 9. The letter rather summarily concludes that, at the particular
time in question, Carmichael's public anti-draft commentary fell within the realm of protected
speech. See id.

Hence, it seems evident that Clark directed no meaningful attention towards the prospect of
pursuing Carmichael on the basis of any charge related to aiding and abetting draft evasion. See
O'Meara, supra note 5, at 1109.
157. See Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 251-52. Interestingly, from a timing
standpoint, the allegations against the Boston Five were based on activities that reportedly
commenced on August 1, 1967, one day before the President's heated cabinet meeting. Id. at 251;
see also supra text accompanying note 127.
158. Id. at 251-52.
159. See Saunders,supra note 43, at 44 ("[T]he five, called the Boston Five because they were
tried in federal court there, had never been in the same room together before the trial.").
160. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 4-5.

161. Id. at 30.
162. See id. at 33; Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 254.
163. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 107-08; Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 255.

Defendants Coffin, Ferber, Raskin, and Spock also participated, along with about 500 other
members of the resistance movement. MICHAEL S. FOLEY, CONFRONTING THE WAR MACHINE:
DRAFT RESISTANCE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 131-32 (2003) (citing WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN,
JR., ONCE TO EVERY MAN: A MEMOIR 247-48 (1977); NORMAN MAILER, THE ARMIES OF THE

NIGHT 74-79 (1968)). For a more detailed description of the demonstration, see MITFORD, supra
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The lead defendant in the indictment was the Reverend William Sloane
Coffin, Jr., the highly respected Chaplain at Yale University and a noteworthy
activist for individual rights.1 64 He was particularly engaged in opposing the
Vietnam War, delivering numerous fiery speeches that openly flouted the draft
laws through blanket calls for resistance. 65 One such address was made in
conjunction with the October 20 demonstration that Goodman coordinated. In
that speech, Coffin proclaimed the following from the steps of the Justice
Department:
We hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in their
refusal to serve in the armed forces as long as the war in Vietnam
continues, and we pledge ourselves to aid and abet them in all the ways
we can. This means that if they are now arrested for failing to comply
with a law that violates their consciences, we too must be arrested, for in
the sight of that law we are now as guilty as they. 166
Defendant Michael Ferber, a Harvard Ph.D. candidate at the time, was the
youngest of the Boston Five and a dedicated member of the student-dominated
"Resistance" movement.167 His defining criminal act for the government's case
against him took the form of an address delivered on October 16, 1967, titled "A
Time to Say No."168 In that speech, Ferber directed unequivocal appeals for
draft avoidance to his listeners:
Let us make sure we are ready to work hard and long with each
other in the months to come, working to make it difficult and politically
dangerous for the government to prosecute us, working to help anyone
and everyone to find ways of avoiding the draft, to help disrupt the
workings of the draft and the armed forces until the war is over.169
The fourth defendant, Marcus Raskin, was perhaps the most low-key of the
five, though equally strident in his opposition to the war.170 He served in the
Kennedy Administration and later co-directed the Institute for Policy Studies in

note 11, at 40-44. See also BRANCH, supra note 73, at 646-47 (recounting the scene of Coffin
delivering the briefcase full of draft cards to Assistant Deputy Attorney General John McDonough).
164. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 39-40 (discussing Coffin's activism during the 1960s).
165. See id. at 37 (describing a post-indictment speech that Coffin delivered as "a good deal
milder than any of his speeches subsequently offered in evidence at the trial").
166. MITFORD, supra note 11, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). Coffin's speech
comprised Overt Act No. 6 of the indictment against the Boston Five. Boston Five Indictment,
supranote 12, at 254.
167. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 18-20. For a discussion of the origins and mission of the
Resistance movement, see id. at 25-28.
168. Id. at 28; Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 254.
169. MITFORD, supra note 11, at 28-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See id. at 45-50.
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Washington, D.C. 17 1 In 1965, he co-authored The Viet-Nam Reader,17 which
presented a history of the conflict and sought to demonstrate why and how the
U.S. should withdraw. 17 3 More significantly, Raskin and Arthur Waskow
drafted and issued a document entitled "A Call to Resist Illegitimate
Authority"1 74 Overt Act No. I in the indictment.175 The "Call" was addressed
to "the young men of America, to the whole of the American people, and to all
men of good will everywhere," 176 and sought to have them formally join in and
pledge their support for the war resistance movement. 177 Among other things, it
articulated and advocated the position that "every free man [had] a legal right
and a moral duty to exert every effort to end [the] war, to avoid collusion with it,
and to encourage others to do the same."1 78
The last, but certainly not the least, of the defendants was renowned
pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, the author of The Common Sense Book ofBaby
and Child Care,179 one of the bestselling books of all time. so Although his
antiwar activities were quite visible and extensive,181 the government
concentrated on his involvement in three of the incidents already mentionedthe October 2, 1967 press conference that Mitchell Goodman organized; the
October 20, 1967 demonstration at the Department of Justice; and the issuance
of "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority."1 82
Though the evidence against the Boston Five seemed to support an
indictment for aiding and abetting violations of the SSA, 183 the government

171. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 48; The Fearsome Five, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20,
1968, at 7.
172. THE VIET-NAM READER (Marcus G. Raskin & Bernard B. Fall eds., 1965).
173. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 48-49.
174. See id. at 49-50 (citing A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct.
12, 1967, at 7) (noting that although there were other drafts of this document circulating around the
country, theirs "was the final one that incorporated the others" and was published in The New York
Review ofBooks and distributed to members of the antiwar movement). It should be noted that the
indictment avers that defendants Coffin and Spock distributed the "Call." Boston Five Indictment,
supranote 12, at 254.
175. Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 254-59.
176. Id. at 255.
177. Id. at 255-57.
178. Id. at 256.
179. BENJAMIN SPOCK, THE COMMON SENSE BOOK OF BABY AND CHILD CARE (1945).
180. See, e.g., RUSSELL ASH, THE Top TEN OF EVERYTHING 124 (1994) (ranking Dr. Spock's
book seventh on the list of all-time bestselling books).
181. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 13-17 (describing some of Dr. Spock's many antiwar
activities).
182. See supra notes 162-63, 166, 174-78 and accompanying text; Boston Five Indictment,
supranote 12, at 254-55.
183. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 35, at 383-84 (observing that the government's "chances of
ultimately prevailing would [have been] significantly higher if it [had] charged a substantive or
accessory crime rather than a tenuous conspiracy among strangers"). But see HARRIS, supra note
103, at 63 ("Conspiracy charges are fairly common legal devices-to a degree, because they're
easier for the prosecution." (internal quotation marks omitted)); MITFORD, supra note 11, at 63-67
(discussing various potential advantages associated with conspiracy charges).
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instead chose to pursue a far more insubstantial conspiracy theory-one that
ultimately did not carry the day in court. 184 It is not clear why the government
did this or, more importantly, why it singled out these defendants to the
exclusion of numerous other potential targets who were engaged in equally
unlawful behavior.185
One theory is that the indictment was a response to an ill-advised
memorandum and explanatory letter issued to all local draft boards by Selective
Service Director Lieutenant General Lewis Hershey, in which he essentially
decreed that draft eligible resisters should be declared delinquent, denied
deferment, and reclassified for immediate induction.186 Because of the outrage
that ensued over these draconian directives, 187 Ramsey Clark and General
Hershey released a joint statement announcing the formation of a special unit
within the Justice Department devoted to investigating and prosecuting, on a
much narrower scale, violations of the Selective Service laws, "with special
attention to violations of the 'counsel, aid, or abet' provisions."
The head of this special unit, John Van de Kamp, acknowledged that the
prosecution of the Boston Five represented an effort to save face after the
Hershey debacle and that the government selected these defendants because of
their notoriety and the large quantity of public evidence available against
them.189 In addition, one commentator has suggested that the indictments may
have been an effort "to send a message that although criticism of the war and the

184. See infra notes 206, 209. Some have contended that the five defendants had little
personal interaction with one another prior to the indictment and apparently had never come
together as a group until that time. See FOLEY, supra note 163, at 228; MITFORD, supra note 11, at

5 ("When for the first time all five met together-after the indictment, in attorney Leonard Boudin's
living room, to discuss their common plight-Boudin says the first thing he felt he could do for
these conspirators was to introduce them to each other."); Saunders, supra note 43, at 44 (indicating
that they "had never been in the same room together before the trial").
185. See FOLEY, supra note 163, at 231 (listing other potential targets that the government
could have indicted).
186. Texts ofLetter and Memo on the Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1967, at 2; see also GEORGE
THE DRAFT, 1940-1973, at 215-16 (1993); GEORGE Q. FLYNN, LEWIS B. HERSHEY,
MR. SELECTIVE SERVICE 259 (1985); FOLEY, supra note 163, at 149-50 (citing JOSEPH A.

Q. FLYNN,

CALIFANO,

JR.,

THE

TRIUMPH

AND

TRAGEDY

OF LYNDON

JOHNSON

198-200

(1991);

Memorandum from Lewis B. Hershey, Dir. of the Selective Serv. Sys., to Selective Serv. Local
Bds. (Oct. 24, 1967) (on file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Califano Papers, Box 55));
MITFORD, supra note 11, at 53-54.

187. See FOLEY, supra note 163, at 150-51 (citing numerous letters exemplifying the
"firestorm of protest" that followed Hershey's issuance of directives, including calls for his
removal).
188. MITFORD, supra note 11, at 55.

See also FOLEY, supra note 163, at 154-55, 230

(quoting Joint Statement by Ramsey Clark, Att'y Gen., and Lewis B. Hershey, Dir. of the Selective
Serv. Sys. (Dec. 9, 1967) (on file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Califano Papers, Box
55)) (citing CALIFANO, supra note 186, at 201-02; FLYNN, supra note 186, at 217-18).
189. See MITFORD, supra note 11, at 56 ("The reason they were singled out, said Mr. Van de
Kamp, was that because of 'their names and personalities' the government managed to subpoena a
large amount of television newsreel footage of [them].").
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draft would be tolerated, 'inducing or procuring evasion' would not."1 90 These
explanations, of course, do not address the rationale for the conspiracy theory,
nor do they adequately explain why the government selected the Boston Five
over other well-known and possibly more notorious flouters of the aiding and
abetting proscription, such as Stokely Carmichael. 191
Besides the two foregoing hypotheses, Ramsey Clark has offered several
alternative, but conflicting, rationales for the Boston Five's prosecution.192 One
position is based on the notion that it is the obligation of the Department of
Justice to prosecute violations of the law-"[I]f the law says that you cannot do
this and you do it, then you've got an obligation to enforce the law." 93
According to him, the Boston Five's patent violation of the letter of the Selective
Service laws necessitated prosecution-a failure to charge them would have
effectively robbed the system of integrity.194 Interestingly, Clark has also
maintained that this prosecutorial argument supported his refusal to pursue
Stokely Carmichael, ostensibly because, in his judgment, the factual basis for a
violation was lacking. 19 5 In Clark's words,
[T]he system has to have integrity. If you don't prosecute violations of
the law, you don't have a government of laws. On the one hand, in my
judgment, if we had prosecuted Carmichael without facts, we would be
guilty of, you know, [the] most serious abuse. But if we didn't
prosecute Spock and Coffin where we did have the facts of violation in
our judgment-this is a matter of judgment-we would be guilty of just
the opposite abuse. It's not a question of morality -who's right....
It's a question of whether the system has integrity.
Clark has further justified his decision to prosecute the Boston Five on the
ground that their conduct was particularly egregious insofar as they were

190. FOLEY, supra note 163, at 230.

191. See id. at 231 (listing other potential targets that could have been indicted).
192. See Clark Interview V, supra note 96.
193. Id.
194. Id.; Saunders, supra note 43, at 44 ("Clark said that he felt obligated to file charges
against the activists .... 'The law either has to do what it says or change what it says, and there was
no chance of changing the draft laws."').
195. Clark Interview V, supra note 96; see also Ward Just, U.S. to Widen Draft Plot

Prosecution,WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1968, at Al ("According to one theory Black Power leaders Rap
Brown and Stokely Carmichael were not included among those indicted because at no time (in the
words of one official) did they move beyond advocacy to action. . . . 'They have done a lot of
talking, that's all' .... ).
196. Clark Interview V, supra note 96; see also HARRIS, supra note 103, at 63 ("As the

nation's chief law-enforcement officer, I had the duty to prosecute Spock and the others when, in
my judgment, the facts showed a violation of the law. If you don't enforce the law, it becomes
shapeless." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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"deliberately endeavoring to destroy the Selective Service System." 197 It seems
difficult to maintain, however, that this characterization meaningfully
distinguishes their efforts from those of other anti-Vietnam War activists. In
Clark's own words, if the facts support a violation of the law, the nature of the
strategy that may have motivated the offense should be irrelevant.1 98
Furthermore, even though Stokely Carmichael's passionate exhortations for
young black men to refuse military service were assuredly inspired more by
impatience with the slow pace of racial progress in America than by a desire to
bring down the Selective Service System, that did not alter the putatively
unlawful nature of his behavior.
More recently, Clark has proffered another interesting take on his
prosecution of the Boston Five, suggesting that his desire to provide a forum for
debating the efficacy of the draft was the stimulus. 19 9 He purportedly "hoped to
show Johnson that opposition to the war wasn't limited to draft-dodging
longhairs but included the most admired pediatrician in America, a prominent
and revered patrician minister, and a respected former Kennedy Administration
official . . . ."20 The problem with this explanation, though, is that President
Johnson was already well aware that Dr. Spock and other mainstream figures
were involved in the antiwar movement20 and could have possessed some
knowledge about the potential for the case before the charges were brought.202

197. Clark Interview V, supra note 96; see also The Fearsome Five, supra note 171, at 7

("Spock, Coffm and Company kept challenging the Justice Department to bring charges against
them, and no prosecutor can very long stay his hand under such circumstances without tendering
some public explanation. An indictment was politically preferable to an explanation, no doubt.").
198. See supratext accompanying note 193.
199. See FOLEY, supra note 163, at 232 (citing TOM WELLS, THE WAR WITHIN: AMERICA'S
BATTLE OVER VIETNAM 234-37 (1994)) ("A draft resistance test case,... would 'ventilate the
issues, escalate them where they can be seen, [and] provide vigorous defense' for the
defendants . . . ." (alteration in original)); Saunders, supra note 43, at 44 ("Clark said he believed
their cases would take a long time and would 'focus attention on the problems of the draft."').
Inferential support for this rationale may be gleaned from Clark's informing the trial judge in the
case that in the event of conviction, the Justice Department would not recommend the imposition of
any jail time. HARRIS, supra note 103, at 64; see also Ramsey Clark, "How Can You Represent
That Man?": Ethics, the Rule of Law, and Defending the Indefensible, 44 GA. L. REv. 921, 925

(2010) (indicating that "[b]efore sentencing in the Spock case, [Clark] personally wrote the judge"
and noting that Clark "thought any penalty would be improper").
200. Saunders, supra note 43, at 45; see also FOLEY, supra note 163, at 232 (citing WELLS,
supra note 199, at 234-37) ("Clark felt he had a duty to avoid injuring 'innocent' people like
ordinary draft resisters who were not engaged in acts of moral turpitude but were acting on
conscience.").
201. See, e.g., MITFORD, supra note 11, at 13 (noting Spock's direct communications to
Johnson expressing opposition to the war and advocating withdrawal).
202. See id. at 58 (recounting a "knowledgeable federal judge" as contending that "[i]n
Johnson's administration,... one would not indict Dr. Spock without first consulting the
President."). But see HARRIS, supra note 103, at 64 ("As with all the other cases that Clark filed as
Attorney General, he did not discuss any aspect of this one beforehand with the President."); Clark,
supra note 199, at 923-24 ("I had a rule with President Johnson: I would not discuss criminal cases
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One final view is that Clark targeted the Boston Five because he could not
feasibly prosecute everyone who was violating the draft laws at that time.203
According to him, the number of draft evaders was staggering, and he was far
more interested in pursuing those who were "aiding and abetting" this evasion
than the actual evaders themselves.204 Clark now maintains that he wanted to
test the efficacy and enforceability of the "counsel, aid and abet" provision and
therefore deliberately selected a handful of people who had a high level of
participation in major antiwar demonstrations.
Ostensibly, this winnowing
206
process, combined with Clark's perplexing choice of a conspiracy theory and
his preference for prosecuting individuals who could afford adequate
207
representation, ultimately led to the selection of the Boston Five.
The multiple, conflicting explanations for the case against the Boston Five
certainly raise legitimate questions regarding the basis for, and propriety of, their
prosecution.208 All the same, it does not necessarily follow that pursuing charges
against them constituted an inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion on
the part of Ramsey Clark. Probable cause clearly was present and the
government initially obtained convictions with regard to four of the
defendants, 209 which suggests that the decision to prosecute, taken in isolation,
may have been entirely justified.210

with anyone besides lawyers in the Department of Justice. He didn't find out about the Spock case
until it was announced in the press.").
203. Cf DAVIS, supra note 21, at 13 ("There are not enough resources in any local criminal
justice system to prosecute every alleged criminal offense.").
204. Telephone Interview with Ramsey Clark, supra note 35, at 4-5; see also supra note 194.
205. Telephone Interview with Ramsey Clark, supra note 35, at 4.
206. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 35, at 384 ("[T]he government,

...

decided to pursue the

conspiracy approach, even though it carried with it the highest likelihood of an eventual appellate
reversal."); Boston Five Indictment, supra note 12, at 251-54. Professor Alan Dershowitz has
suggested that the conspiracy charge may have been an effort to more widely "discourag[e]
organized opposition to the Vietnam War." DERSHOWITZ, supra note 35, at 384. See generally id.

at 384-87 (discussing possible theories for the government's conspiracy charge).
207. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 45 (noting that long after the case was over, Clark
reportedly told Coffin that he "had a choice to arrest a hundred students or select five people who
could take financial care of themselves" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Clark, supra
note 199, at 925 ("Dr. Spock and the other four defendants could present the best defense the law
offered."); cf THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALI: His LIFE AND TIMES 174-75 (1991) (discussing

Ramsey Clark's difficulty related to his decision to prosecute Muhammad Ali for draft evasion and
noting that one positive aspect of the case was that "there was power on both sides to shape and test
the issues").
208. See, e.g., WILKINS, supra note 9, at 231 (observing that although Wilkins was not

involved in the decision to prosecute the Boston Five, he believes it to have been "one call that
[Clark] would like to have back").
209. Defendant Raskin was the only member of the Boston Five acquitted at trial. MITFORD,
supra note 11, at 45. It should be noted, however, that on appeal, the convictions of Spock and
Ferber were overturned, and the government declined to retry Coffm and Goodman. Saunders,
supranote 43, at 45.

210. In a memorandum directed to Ramsey Clark concerning the sentencing of the four
members of the Boston Five who were convicted, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold stated the
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The problem is, however, that one cannot reasonably conduct a solitary
assessment of the Boston Five prosecution. The unlawful actions at issue were
not unique-there were other offenders whom the government could have
prosecuted for the same alleged misconduct, even after taking into account the
various prosecution-narrowing considerations that may have been utilized.211 As
a result, Ramsey Clark's decision did not merely boil down to whether or not to
prosecute those particular men, it also involved an element of choice-as
between multiple potential targets, whom should he pursue?
IV. SELECTIVE NON-PROSECUTION

Without question, prosecutors are enormously powerful.212 As Attorney
General Robert Jackson famously said in his 1940 speech to a gathering of U.S.
attorneys: "The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous."213 Among the
array of potent discretionary decisions that prosecutors are authorized to

following: "It is clear that the defendants have broken the law. . . . What the government basically
needed to do here was to establish the law. That it has done. That is a significant and useful
achievement." Memorandum from Erwin Griswold, Solicitor Gen., to Ramsey Clark, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (July 2, 1968) (on file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Personal Papers of Ramsey
Clark, Box 123, "Selective Service Cases Prosecuted 1967-1968").
The point of Griswold's memo was to convey his view that the convictions alone were enough
and that pursuing severe penalties would be a mistake. See id. Clark certainly agreed, see Clark,
supranote 199, at 925, but the judge in the case did not. In sentencing the four defendants, the
judge maintained that:
It is the view of this Court that it is reasonably inferrable that the defendants here
played some material part in inciting certain draft evaders to flout the law. It would be
preposterous to sentence young men to jail for violation of the Selective Service Act and
allow those who, as the jury found, conspired to incite Selective Service registrants to
take action to violate the law and who, it is reasonable to conclude, were instrumental in
inciting them to do so, to escape under the guise of free speech.
Copy of Judge Francis Ford's Remarks at Sentencing of Spock, et al. (on file with the Lyndon
Baines Johnson Library, Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box 123, "Selective Service Cases
Prosecuted 1967-1968").
211. See, e.g., The StartlingIndictment of Spock, LEWISTON TRIB. (Idaho), Jan. 7, 1968 (on

file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box 123,
"Selective Service Cases Prosecuted 1967-1968") ("If there is reason for action against [the Boston
Five], the grounds are equally sound against scores of others."); see also supra text accompanying
notes 204-07.
212. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 21, at 5 ("Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the
criminal justice system.").
213. Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Att'y Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 J. Am. INST. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940-1941). President Franklin Delano Roosevelt later appointed Jackson as
an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and he served in that capacity from 1941-1954.
See James M. Marsh, Robert H. Jackson, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 406, 408 (Clare

Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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render,214 none is more important or more insulated from review than the
decision to charge.2 15 Jackson referred to it as "the most dangerous power of the
prosecutor"-the danger being "that he will pick people that he thinks he should
get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted."2 16 Along the same lines,
another commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a "federal prosecutor is
virtuallK free to charge anyone he chooses with any crime that strikes his
fancy.
While these assessments may sound rather exaggerated, they are actually
highly representative of the widely held perception that some prosecutors wield
their awesome power in an arbitrary and unchecked manner. 2 18 Claims that
prosecutors have abused their discretion by wrongfully charging or
"overcharging"219 particular defendants are not uncommon20-though
disturbingly unlikely to result in professional discipline.221

214. A prosecutor's discretionary authority includes: "decid[ing] whether or not to bring
criminal charges; who to charge; what charges to bring; whether a defendant will stand trial, plead
guilty, or enter a correctional program in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer immunity
from prosecution." GERSHMAN, supra note 20, § 4:1.
215. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[Prosecutors'] broad discretion
rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review."); DAVIS, supra note 21, at 22 ("The charging decision is the most important prosecutorial
power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of prosecutorial discretion.");
GERSHMAN, supra note 20,

§ 4:1

(citing ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 4

(1981)) ("[T]he prosecutor enjoys considerable independence from the judiciary, his administrative
superiors, and the public."); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of
ProsecutorialChargingDecisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion Knowing There
Will be Consequencesfor Crossingthe Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 374 (2000) (citing MILLER, supra
note 26, at 151-350; Robert L. Misner, Recasting ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 741 (1996); James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice

Officials, 4 DUKE L.J. 651, 652, 678-81 (1976)) ("The prosecutor's decision as to whether or not to
charge a suspect is virtually unchecked by formal constraints [or] regulatory mechanisms, making it
one of the broadest discretionary powers in criminal administration."); supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
216. Jackson, supra note 213, at 5.
217. LAWLESS, supra note 17, § 3.08. It has been colloquially stated that "[a] grand jury
would indict a ham sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to." 1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E.
SHAw, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 6.1,

at 255 (2006).

218. See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 16 ("The lack of enforceable standards and effective
accountability to the public has resulted in decision-making that often appears arbitrary, especially
during the critical charging and plea bargaining stages of the process."); id. at 286 (observing that
the ethical rules do not prohibit overcharging and that because "the probable cause standard is so
easy to achieve, an unethical prosecutor may bring an indictment against an individual even if she
knows that she ultimately will not be able to prove that person's guilt").
219. "Overcharging" refers to "a practice that involves 'tacking on' additional charges that
[prosecutors] know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or that they can technically prove
but [that] are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate." Id. at 31; cf
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.9(f) (1992) ("The

prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be
supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.").
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Prosecutors who decline to initiate criminal proceedings, on the other hand,
are typically not viewed as having arbitrarily exercised their discretion and,
therefore, are even less likely to have such decisions meaningfully examined"[ilf a prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, there is no judicial recourse to
compel prosecution." 222 A host of reasons have traditionally been accepted as
valid grounds for foregoing prosecution, including finite resources, the relatively
minor nature of an offense, a willingness to cooperate, and the absence of a
criminal record.223
Indeed, the only potential problem presented by a refusal to prosecute would
be if other similarly culpable offenders were prosecuted on some
unconstitutionally arbitrary basis, such as race.224 Otherwise, "a prosecutor
under his broad discretionary mandate generally is entitled to sin le out for
prosecution one ... sus ect[] and decline to prosecute . . others," 2 2 so long as
probable cause exists.
And this is concededly the norm, as successful
challenges based on so-called "selective prosecution" are exceptionally rare in

220. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 20 (manuscript at 6) (observing that "dubious charging
decisions involving innocent suspects do not exist purely in the world of hypothetical cases" and
proceeding to discuss the Duke Lacrosse prosecution).
221. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 6-9) (citing N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(a) (2004); Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications:
A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice," 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007)) (discussing the

infamous Duke Lacrosse case and noting that although Durham, North Carolina District Attorney
Mike Nifong was disbarred on grounds related to his handling of the case, the "deferential ethical
rule" likely explains why the state bar never pursued disciplinary charges for abuse of discretion in
pursuing rape charges against the three Duke Lacrosse players). For a detailed account of the Duke
Lacrosse case, see STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007).

222. GERSHMAN, supra note 20, § 4:5; see also LaFave, supra note 20, at 538 (citing Moses v.
Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D.D.C. 1963)) ("If a specific instance of nonenforcement is
challenged in the courts by way of a mandamus action, the usual response is that the matter rests
with the executive rather than the judicial branch of government."); supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
223. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 17,

§ 9-27.220

(1997) ("[P]rosecution should be

declined [if]: (1) [n]o substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution; (2) [t]he person is
subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) [t]here exists an adequate noncriminal alternative to prosecution."); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE Standard 3-3.9(b) (1992) (setting forth various illustrative factors that prosecutors "may
properly consider in exercising [prosecutorial] discretion"); DAVIS, supra note 21, at 24 ("If the
charge is very minor, and the arrestee has no criminal record, the prosecutor may decide to forgo
charges altogether."); id. at 41 (noting the necessity of weighing practical considerations, such as
caseloads and resources, in making charging decisions); supra note 28.
224. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 22
("The mere failure to prosecute other perpetrators is not, in and of itself, sufficient to raise a claim
of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement."); GERSHMAN, supra note 20, § 4:9(a) ("Arbitrary
selection of a defendant may violate principles of equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and thus make out the defense of selective prosecution." (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S.
at 465; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1994))); supra note 19 and accompanying text.
225. GERSHMAN, supra note 20,

§ 4:9.

226. See supranotes 18, 20 and accompanying text.
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light of the demanding legal standard employed, which requires a showing of
discrimination in both effect and purpose.
Nevertheless, the facts and circumstances surrounding Ramsey Clark's
prosecution of the all-white Boston Five, to the exclusion of Stokely Carmichael,
supply a highly plausible basis for maintaining that Clark may have engaged in
selective prosecution, albeit in a reverse discriminatory sense. Of course, the
manner in which he evaded bringing charges against Carmichael has the aura of
validity, but on closer examination, that perception blurs. Namely, by focusing
on the crime of conspiracy to incite a riot, rather than aiding and abetting draft
evasion (or "conspiracy" to do so), Clark was able to represent legitimately to
President Johnson and other Carmichael condemners that the necessary
evidence-evidence to establish a causal link between the "inciteful" oratory and
the riots-was lacking. 2 2 8 Clark, however, likely would have viewed such a
charge with a healthy dose of informed skepticism, even absent the alleged lack
of evidence.
Specifically, Clark would have understood better than almost anyone that the
root cause of the riots was far deeper than the mere words of any one activist,
given his involvement with the investigation into the Watts riots and other
similar instances of urban racial unrest. 22 9 As noted earlier, the Johnson
Administration never released his graphic report on the Watts riots, perhaps
because it contained a story that President Johnson and others would have
preferred not be told. 2 3 0 As a result, it is not beyond reason to posit that Ramsey
Clark may have been endeavoring to send a not-so-subtle message by
demonstrating that the government could not successfully prosecute Carmichael

227. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 20-21 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985)) ("As a practical matter, however, the Supreme Court has made it exceptionally difficult for

a defendant to defeat a criminal prosecution on the grounds of invidious discrimination. To make
out a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must show both discriminatory effect (that is, that
persons of other races, religions or genders were equally subject to prosecution but were not
charged) and discriminatory purpose (that is, the prosecutor made his charging decision on the basis
of the defendant's race, sex, or religion)."); Moore, supra note 215, at 388 ("Having the right to file
a motion claiming selective prosecution based on race or other impermissible grounds offers little
protection to a defendant. Indeed, the trend of courts has been to increasingly limit the application
of this remedy."); Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, ProsecutorialMisconduct: Alive and Well,
and Living in Indiana?, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657, 661 (1990) (assessing unsuccessful selective

prosecution claims in Indiana, maintaining that "the burden of proof placed upon the claimant to
show current discriminatory intent results in an insurmountable burden that virtually emasculates
the meritorious allegations"); Podgor, supranote 23, at 463 (citing Podgor & Weiner, supra, at 661)
("[F]ew cases successfully prove selective prosecution on the part of the prosecutor."). It is also
significant to note that the defendant's onerous burden in proving selective prosecution is further
compounded by the demanding standard imposed for obtaining discovery from the government in
support of such a claim. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468 ("The justifications for a rigorous standard
for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard
for discovery in aid of such a claim.").
228. See MCPHERSON, supra note 131, at 363; Clark Interview V, supranote 96.
229. See supranotes 48-59 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also WILKINS, supra note 9, at 173.
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for conspiracy to incite a riot. Conceivably, this was a clever subterfuge
intended to force President Johnson and other members of the Administration to
acknowledge the real problems at the core of the riots in Watts and other urban
areas.231 Whatever Clark's true motivation, it is hard to imagine that he took
seriously the prospect of indicting Stokely Carmichael for conspiracy to incite a
riot.232
Furthermore, the fact that Clark apparently gave no significant consideration
to the possibility of charging Carmichael with the crime of aiding and abetting,
or "conspiracy to aid and abet" SSA violations, suggests that Clark really did not
want to prosecute Carmichael, period.233 Clearly, had the desire been there, he
could have done so because the existence of probable cause seemed
irrefutable. 234 Hence, the question that still lingers is: Why would Clark fail to
pursue Carmichael on this basis? Stokely Carmichael's very words may provide
some insight regarding one possible answer.
In the same 1966 speech quoted at the beginning of this article, Carmichael
noted that the philosophers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre posed the
question of whether or not it is possible for a man to condemn himself.235
Though they apparently failed to provide a response, black existentialist Frantz
Fanon did-concluding that the answer was "no." 236 Carmichael agreed and
proceeded to use as an example the infamous Philadelphia, Mississippi murders
of civil rights workers James Chaney, Mickey Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman
in 1964.
According to Carmichael, the local white community did not
condemn those responsible for the murders because to condemn them would
have been tantamount to condemning themselves-he maintained that they had
elected the sheriff and his deputies to do precisely what they had done.238
Although I am not sure that I completely accept Fanon's theory as
Carmichael employs it in this example, it does have some appeal and potential
legitimacy when applied to Ramsey Clark's refusal to prosecute Carmichael.
For Clark, charging Carmichael would have been akin to condemning himself,
given his plain identification with the plight of black Americans,239 as well as his
openness to Carmichael's views on race and black resistance to the Vietnam

231. See supranotes 49-53, 124 and accompanying text.
232. Cf Clark Interview V, supra note 96 (noting that President Johnson wanted Clark to be
tougher on dissenters, but that Clark believed this was explained by the fact that Johnson was
"outraged by Carmichael" and was not a lawyer).
233. See supranote 156 and accompanying text.
234. See supranotes 1,80-88 and accompanying text.
235. See Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 46.
236. See id.
237. See id; HALBERSTAM, supra note 68, at 479-80 (discussing the shocking murders and

their impact on President Johnson and his push for civil rights reforms).
238. See Carmichael, Berkeley Speech, supra note 1, at 46.
239. See HARRIS, supra note 103, at 15 (during an appearance on the Today Show, Clark
stated that as Attorney General "I have the responsibility for enforcement of the civil-rights laws-a
responsibility, I might add, I cherish. I think it's essential to the future of this nation that we
vigorously enforce those laws."); supraPart II.A.
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War. In other words, Clark likely viewed Carmichael through a "civil rights,"
rather than an "antidraft," lens. From Clark's perspective, Stokely Carmichael's
antiwar message was simply a vehicle for pushing his broader agenda of the
necessity for "Black Power"-it was a convenient platform for the expression of
his views on race, but it was not what he was all about.240 As a result, it is
reasonable to conclude that Clark probably never considered prosecuting
Carmichael under the SSA because he viewed Carmichael as separate from the
Boston Five and other outspoken white opponents of the draft.
Based on this assessment of Ramsey Clark's charging decision, one could
rationally maintain that he pursued the Boston Five, at least in part, because they
were white (or at least, not black), a constitutionally impermissible
consideration. However, it may be more accurate to contend that rather than
overtly selecting the Boston Five because they were white, Clark opted to refrain
from prosecuting Stokely Carmichael because he was black. Thus, this was
really a case of "selective non-prosecution," which, though still facially
improper, has a less condemnable countenance under the circumstances,
particularly given the likely motivation for Clark's failure to charge.
Yet, his decision remains somewhat problematic from the perspective of
Clark's role as a prosecutor, especially when measured against his personal,
stringent charging standards. As already noted, throughout his tenure as
Attorney General, Clark consistently maintained that it was vital for our legal
system to have integrity, and if he failed to prosecute someone when the facts
clearly pointed to a violation, he would rob the system of that all-important
attribute.24 1
Moreover, in defending his prosecution of the aiders and abettors of draft
resistance, Clark has stated that "[t]he law either has to do what it says or change
what it says, and there was no chance of changing the draft laws." 242 By holding
up this principle as a justification for pursuing the Boston Five, while
simultaneously evading a similar course with regard to Stokely Carmichael,
Clark seems to have done precisely what he firmly believed prosecutors should
not do. His multiple prosecutorial explanations are suggestive of a private
struggle to reconcile this incongruity.243 Indeed, a sense of internal ambivalence
about the case can be gleaned from Clark's concession that "[o]ne could believe
that Spock was morally right-as I may have, in fact-and still believe that the
laws had to be enforced."
But at what toll personally?
Some have argued that Ramsey Clark's controversial post-Attorney General
representations have been an effort to atone for the sin of prosecuting the Boston

240.
241.
242.
243.

Telephone Interview with Ramsey Clark, supra note 35, at 4-5.
See supranotes 193-94, 196 and accompanying text.
Saunders, supra note 43, at 44.
See supratext accompanying notes 192-207.

244. HARRIS, supra note 103, at 63.
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Five.245 In other words, if someone as incorruptible as him could make a grave
error in judgment, it is highly probable that other prosecutors may do the
same 246-possibly with far more dire consequences. Indeed, it is conceivable
that Clark has devoted his entire post-government career to ferreting out such
wrongs, trying to ensure that prosecutors seek justice in an independent and
impartial manner.247 While certainly a noble effort at atonement, if true, this
theory fails to shed any light on the basis for Clark's evasive refusal to prosecute
Stokely Carmichael and its problematic inconsistency with the rigid decision to
pursue the Boston Five.
I firmly believe that the most credible explanation, valid or not, was race.
Ramsey Clark's civil rights pedi ree and profound understanding of the plight of
black Americans in the 1960s caused him to assess their putatively unlawful
behavior on a scale of justice heavily weighted with a presumption in their favor.
Blacks at that time clearly perceived the "law" as a tool of oppression, used to
subjugate them to an unequal stature in virtually every aspect of society. Hence,
to Ramsey Clark, it would have been perverse to place blacks on equal footing
with whites when the question was one of criminal culpability. In his mind, to
be sure, this would have served only to reinforce their view of the unjust and
oppressive nature of the law.249
For Clark, the law must have integrity above all else.250 His refusal to
prosecute Stokely Carmichael, as curious as it may seem in retrospect, was
entirely consistent with this sacred ideal.
V. CONCLUSION

Broadly speaking, a prosecutor's role is not to secure convictions but to act
as a "minister of justice."2 51 On the one hand, in refraining from indicting

245. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 45 ("Both [David] McReynolds and Mel Wulf think
Clark may have felt guilty enough about the prosecution [of the Boston Five] that he decided to
spend his career doing penance."). Among some of Clark's more notorious clients are Saddam
Hussein, reputed Nazi war criminal Karl Linnas, and former Yugoslavian leader Slobodan
Milosevic. See Brown, supra note 38, at 49, 92-93. For a discussion of Clark's representation of
Saddam Hussein, see Brown, supra note 38, at 101-29.
246. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 46 ("[Clark] may have come to believe that anyoneeven the most noble-seeming person with the best motives-could repeat his mistakes.").
247. See id. ("[Clark has] defended the unpopular against prosecutions that have almost
universal support, perhaps in part because he feels that he himself once naively, or unwittingly,
represented the face of the persecutory state.").
248. See supraPart II.A.

249. See Telephone Interview with Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Att'y Gen. 2 (July 27, 2010).
250. See supranote 196 and accompanying text.
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010) ("A prosecutor has the

responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); see also Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
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Stokely Carmichael, Ramsey Clark arguably epitomized this lofty standard,
maintaining his independence and refusing to succumb to powerful political
pressure. Yet, on the other hand, by concurrently prosecuting the Boston Five,
arguably based on race, he seems to have been the very antithesis, undermining
the revered concept of equal justice under the law.252 All the more confounding,
Clark's disparate and perhaps unconstitutional treatment of actors who were
outwardly similarly situated remains paradoxically admirable and just, evincing
his compassion and earnest commitment to the plight of African-Americans in
the 1960s.
Ultimately, this perplexing discord makes it impossible to condemn outright
what Ramsey Clark did, but it also makes it legally cumbersome to heap
unqualified praise upon him. As a result, it seems most appropriate to attribute
his actions to what I term as the exercise of "prosecutorial indiscretion," a
studied characterization that fittingly acknowledges Clark's well-placed
intentions in the midst of overwhelming sociopolitical circumstances. Whether
or not this "prosecutorial indiscretion" in charging constituted a technical,
merits-based error in the execution of his "most dangerous power" 253-guided
by his heartfelt devotion to civil rights and profound empathy for the legally
oppressed-Ramsey Clark unquestionably sought to do what he felt was right.
In the final analysis, what more could one legitimately ask of our nation's chief
prosecutor?

ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2(c) (1992) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek

justice, not merely to convict.").
252. See Podgor,supra note 23, at 469 ("The lopsided presentation to charge some individuals
while not charging others when the activities are threaded together-even loosely-defeats the goal
of fostering an equitable legal system.").
253. See supranote 216 and accompanying text.
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